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I) Introduction 
A wide variety of studies has acknowledged the ubiquitous role of emotions in 
shaping human cognition, behavior (Forgas, 1998; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; 
Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Parkinson, 1996; Thompson, 1990), as well as 
processes such as  decision making and negotiation (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & 
Raia, 1997; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Kumar, 1997; Morris & 
Keltner, 2000). Some broadly supported findings include the effect of emotions 
on negotiators’ beliefs and preferences (Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Obeidi, Hipel, & 
Kilgour, 2005), information-processing (Allred et al., 1997; Hegtvedt & Killian, 
1999; Shapiro, 2002), judgements (Forgas, 1998; Lupton, Hine, & Murphy, 
2002), innovative thinking and creativity in solving problems (Barry & Oliver, 
1996; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998). Moreover, emotions are a 
constant source of valuable information on the sender’s beliefs, preferences 
and intentions (Barry, 2007; Druckman & Olekalns, 2007; Hegtvedt & Killian, 
1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Scherer, 1986). 
These implications of emotions have to be researched more extensively within 
online communication, because the increasing importance and omnipresence of 
information technology in everyday life is causing an even greater reliance of 
people on computer-based communication, which is not devoid of emotional 
content. This is why electronic negotiations have become an increasingly 
frequent topic in the scientific research literature. With regard to this 
development, we are interested in the way emotions are conveyed and 
expressed in an online setting. Specifically, the underlying motivation of this 
study refers to the insufficiently explored effects of a decision support system 
(DSS) and a negotiation support system (NSS) on the emotional patterns that 
evolve within an online negotiation encounter. Keeping in consideration the 
seminal studies on Phase Model Theory (Douglas, 1962; Holmes, 1992), and in 
line with the emotional stage models proposed by Kumar (1997) and Morris & 
Keltner (2000), we acknowledge that online negotiations also go through a 
series of emotionally different phases. We thus aim to uncover specific 
emotional dynamics that are characteristic for successful and failed negotiations 
with and without DSS. In addition, we make suggestions regarding the timing of 
use of a Negotiator Assistant.  
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A) Emotions in Negotiations: Theoretical Introduction 
“Emotion may well be not the missing link in negotiation, but in fact the very essence of 
it.” (Barry, 2007 p. 104) 
There are countless definitions that are aimed at describing emotions and their 
functions. However, the majority of research has neglected to investigate their 
influence on the bargaining process that takes place in negotiations. 
A great deal of researchers specialized in the topic of emotions in negotiations 
hold that its role in negotiations has been highly underestimated in the literature 
(Barry & Oliver, 1996; Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Kumar, 1997; Morris & 
Keltner, 2000; M. A. Neale & Northcraft, 1991). However, lately the interest for 
this issue has increased, as did the number of theoretical papers and empirical 
studies focused on the relationship between emotions and negotiations (see 
e.g. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Kumar, 1997; 
Van Kleef, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004, 2010).   
Beside the fact that there still is no unique view on the role of emotions in 
negotiations among researchers (Allred et al., 1997; Barry & Fulmer, 2004; 
Kumar, 1997), the generally present view on the subject is that the influence of 
emotions on the negotiation process is negative (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 
1998; Kumar, 1997; Shapiro, 2002). However, recent studies have begun to 
acknowledge that the influence of emotions can be positive as well as negative 
(O’Connor et al., 2002; Shapiro, 2002). If we look at findings from other 
scientific areas, such as the study of non-verbal cues in face-to-face 
interactions (Barry, 2007; Barsade, 2002; Morris & Keltner, 2000) or 
synchronous and asynchronous online communication (Friedman et al., 2004; 
Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 2006; Thompson & 
Nadler, 2002), we are able to conclude that emotions play a crucial role in all 
types of communication (Hippmann, 2009).  
Negotiation, as a primary way of managing and resolving inter-personal conflict, 
is expected to be influenced by emotions that arise in conflict situations (Allred 
et al., 1997). The cognitive decision-making perspective that was dominant in 
the 1980s viewed the negotiator as a mere decision maker faced with a 
situation to resolve conflicts in a rational manner and therefore emphasized the 
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cognitive aspects, and neglected the emotional nature of social interaction 
(Adler et al., 1998; Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Morris & 
Keltner, 2000). In relation to this, Thomas (1992) argues that the analysis of 
negotiations from a strictly cognitive or economical perspective tends to 
excessively “sanitize” the negotiation process because it does not consider 
emotions and their effects. It is safe to say that recent research has come very 
far since the first mentions of the different processes that evolve within 
negotiations. We can now state with certainty that emotions are a category of 
influential variables whose importance for the negotiation process should by no 
means be underestimated (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; 
Scherer, 1986).  
In the first part of this thesis we will attempt to portray the major theories 
regarding the roles of emotions in negotiations, followed by a critical discussion 
of the different approaches. Then, we will provide a summary of the ways in 
which emotions may influence negotiators, the decisions they make and the 
actions they take. At the end of the first part, the reader should be aware of the 
importance of emotions in negotiations. 
 
 
A.1) Definitions  
 
The study of negotiations has come very far since the 1980s, as many studies 
and theories published since then can confirm. Earlier studies of negotiations 
saw them as a sort of  “problem to be solved” and the cognitive side of 
bargaining was at the center of the researchers' attention (Barry, 2007). 
Negotiation was then defined as “[…] the process by which parties with non-
identical preferences allocate resources through interpersonal activity and joint 
decision making“ (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987). However, later studies on this 
topic see negotiations, and specifically dyadic negotiations, as a “natural arena” 
for the observation and analysis of emotions and affect in general because it is 
essentially a form of human interaction, which has both social and emotional 
10 
 
implications (Barry, 2007; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Ekman, 1993; Van Kleef et al., 
2010).   
Due to the specific way basic emotions are experienced and expressed, 
emotions are sometimes referred to as “individual difference variables” (Barry & 
Oliver, 1996; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Kelly & Barsade, 
2001). At this point, a distinction between the concepts of emotion, mood and 
affect has to be made, although precise psychological definitions of these terms 
tend to be rather tricky (Forgas, 1998). Consequently, many researchers tend to 
use them interchangeably. Under the term “affect” a broad category of affective 
concepts  including emotions and moods are considered (Anderson & 
Thompson, 2004; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Kopelman et al., 
2006; Morris & Keltner, 2000).  
Emotions are intense and discrete states that last relatively short and are mostly 
triggered by a specific event. Moods, on the other hand, are diffuse 
psychological states that have a longer duration and are less directly related to 
a single event (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Ekman, 
1999; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Kopelman et al., 2006; Morris & Keltner, 2000). 
They can be experienced more than once in the course of a day and may last 
for hours, even days (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Baron, 1993). However, 
there is reason to think that moods and emotions are interdependent (Li & 
Roloff, 2006). For instance, someone in a bad mood is more likely to feel 
emotions like anger and sadness than someone in a good mood (Li & Roloff, 
2006). Since emotions are a more intense form of affect, it is hypothesized that 
they might exert a greater effect on the negotiation than moods (Allred et al., 
1997).  
 
 
A.2) Why Emotions Matter 
 […] negotiation reveals the range of human emotion. (Morris & Keltner, 2000 p.2) 
Researchers that focus on topics of social interaction hold that the traditional 
view of negotiations as decision-making problems that need to be solved 
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rationally is outdated and needs to be re-investigated (Bazerman et al., 2000; 
Forgas, 1998; Raiffa, 1982; Thomas, 1992). Negotiators are, in fact, influenced 
by a wide range of factors during the negotiation process. They are often 
confronted by biased information processing (Pinkley, Gelfand, & Duan, 2005), 
individual judgment and decision biases (Carnevale, 2007), time constraints (De 
Dreu, 2003) and therefore a such cannot make fully rational decisions 
(Thompson, 1990). Another critical aspect often mentioned in the literature is 
the practice of analyzing negotiations using bounded rationality and strict 
mathematical models (e.g. in game and decision theory) that are not able to 
account for the interpersonal relational dynamics that evolve in negotiations 
(Obeidi et al., 2005). In fact, a study by  O’Connor et al. (2002) found that, when 
people consider how they should react to an interpersonal disagreement they 
think of rational, cool-headed responses, but when they think about what  they 
want to do, they actually react in a more emotional manner.  Furthermore, 
negotiations are an intrinsic element of human life, much like emotions, and are 
therefore affected by typically human characteristics which in turn make them 
less rational (Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Obeidi et al., 2005; 
Thompson, 1990).  
While earlier research addressed mainly the social and psychological factors 
that influence human behavior on the level of a single negotiator (Anderson & 
Thompson, 2004; Carnevale, 2007), more recent studies focus on the joint  
interactions between negotiators (Adair & Brett, 2005; Mara Olekalns, 2002; 
Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). This line of research is linked to the increasing 
attention focused on  the inter-personal effects of emotions in negotiations 
(Druckman & Olekalns, 2007; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2010), 
rather than focusing only on the effects of emotions in terms of intra-personal 
mechanisms.   
That being said, it is important to mention that emotions are “dynamic in nature” 
(Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009) and tend to “evolve and change over time” (p.7) 
within a negotiation situation (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Hippmann, 2009) 
influencing the negotiation process as a whole.  A first step to understanding the 
interdependence of emotions and negotiations could be made by investigating 
the individual-level differences and situational variables that define the 
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negotiation context (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Bazerman et al., 2000; Kelly & 
Barsade, 2001; Morris & Keltner, 2000).  
Emotions occur within a relationship (Shapiro, 2002) and, thanks to them, 
relationships are built and sustained (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Morris 
& Keltner, 2000; Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 2006) because negotiators use them 
to communicate their identity concerns to their negotiation partner (Shapiro, 
2002), or even use them to fix damaged relationships (Hegtvedt & Killian, 
1999). Shapiro (2002) argues that emotion assumes a „forward-looking 
communicative function“ (p.6) and according to Morris & Keltner (2000) they are 
„interpersonal communication systems“ (p.1) that assist in the search for 
solutions of problems that arise in dyadic and group negotiations. Although 
emotional expressions constantly evolve and change in the course of a 
negotiation, they serve negotiators to draw conclusions about their sender by 
detecting and analyzing the information in the exact moment it is retrieved 
(Morris & Keltner, 2000). Thus, emotions may help to resolve relational 
problems that arise in negotiations, such as hierarchy and trust, promote a 
positive relationship between the parties and future commitment between them 
(Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Lawler & Yoon, 1993). In situations of relational 
uncertainty about the counterpart, his intentions and the situation in play, people 
usually make use of their personal judgement, whose formation is closely 
related to one's emotions. In this case, emotions as sources of information  
compensate for the missing information in order to avoid problems that may 
arise (Allred et al., 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Daniel Shapiro, 2002). 
Similarly, judgements of responsibility may influence the emotional regard for 
the counterpart that will in turn influence the desire to cooperate in the future 
with the same person (Allred et al., 1997). Perceptions of justice, both 
distributive and procedural,  also affect emotions and thus the relationship 
between the negotiators (Kumar, 1997), as justice gives direction to our feeling 
of what is right and what is not (Solomon, 1989). Similarly, emotions are also 
affected by expectations one has about the negotiation process and outcome 
(Barry & Oliver, 1996; Mara Olekalns, Robert, Smith, & Carnevale, 2005). .  
Emotions are also known to impact the evolvement of the negotiation process in 
that they impact the negotiators' beliefs and preferences (Barry & Fulmer, 2004; 
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Obeidi et al., 2005; Van Kleef, 2008), judgements (Forgas, 1998; Lupton et al., 
2002) and  risk-taking behavior (Isen & Patrick, 1983). More importantly, 
emotions influence the way in which negotiators process information relevant to 
the negotiation (Allred et al., 1997; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Shapiro, 2002).  
One of the most important characteristics of emotions in the negotiation context 
is in fact their informational character, which allows them to transmit important 
messages pertaining to their sender, his/her emotions, beliefs, preferences and 
intentions and to information about the contextual (i.e. situational) environment 
(Barry, 2007; Butt, Choi, & Jaeger, 2005; Druckman & Olekalns, 2007; Hegtvedt 
& Killian, 1999; Melo, Carnevale, & Gratch, 2011; Morris & Keltner, 2000; 
Overbeck, Neale, & Govan, 2010; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; Van 
Kleef et al., 2010). Negotiation situations are typically characterized by a lack of 
relevant information (Hippmann, 2009), be it information about the issues in 
stake or information about the counterpart. The negotiator therefore 
compensates by making use of information provided by his own judgment, 
which in turn is affected by his own emotional evaluations of the counterpart, 
the negotiation situation and the issues at stake (Parkinson, 1996; Thompson, 
1990). In this way, emotions also create additional information that was not 
present before (Ekman, 1993; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002; 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Scherer, 1986; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2004a; Van Kleef et al., 2010) 
In a negotiation situation, emotions tend to signal that the events or issues 
related to the negotiation are important to the negotiator (Frijda, 1988; O’Connor 
et al., 2002), and they help the negotiator prioritize his/her goals in order to 
respond to changes in the environment more readily (Frijda, 1988; Van Kleef et 
al., 2010). Further, emotional expressions are known to evoke complementary 
(e.g. expressions of anger that evoke fear) or reciprocal (e.g. expressions of 
pleasure that evoke pleasure) emotions in counterparts and act like „[...] positive 
or negative reinforcers for others' behavior“ (Van Kleef, 2008 p.5).  
In conclusion, there is wide agreement in the literature that negotiators’ affect 
exerts a strong effect on negotiations as it shapes social behavior (Frijda, 
1988), negotiations (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Mara Olekalns, 2002) and 
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coordinates social interaction within the negotiation context (Morris & Keltner, 
2000). One’s tendency to experience and express emotions can greatly affect 
his/her behavior in negotiation situations, the way others see him/her and the 
negotiation outcome (Anderson & Thompson, 2004). As a result of these 
findings, negotiators need to keep in mind the importance emotions have in 
relation to negotiations and they need to be aware of the advantage they could 
have over others if they learned to deal with them properly (Daniel Shapiro, 
2002, 2005). To quote the German philosopher Nietzsche (1886/1996): “The 
will to overcome an emotion is ultimately nothing but the will of another – or 
several other – emotions”.  
 
 
A.3 Basic Effects of Emotions 
 
The first empirically relevant research on the topic of the effect of emotions on 
negotiations is represented in a seminal study by Carnevale & Isen (1986), 
where  “[…] the combined effects of mood and visual access between 
negotiators on the process and outcome of an integrative bargaining task” were 
at the center of the investigation (Barry, 2007 p.98). Carnevale & Isen (1986) 
found that positive affect tends to reduce the use of contentious negotiation 
tactics and increases joint profits, for both negotiations with and without visual 
access. Even for situations where negotiators express negative emotions, a 
visual barrier helps to promote cooperation and more integrative behavior 
(Carnevale & Isen, 1986).  
The understanding of positive and negative emotions is of great importance, as 
is the interpretation of the wide range of effects they have on human behavior. 
The basic emotions perspective introduced by Ekman (1999) argues that 
traditionally positive, or traditionally negative emotions differ one from another in 
a number of ways. This perspective is contrary to the traditional view that sees 
all emotions as equal, differing only in terms of the level of intensity or pleasure 
they express. Furthermore, several other studies have shown that the effects of 
emotions cannot be only viewed in terms of their positive or negative valence 
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(Butt et al., 2005; De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Van 
Kleef et al., 2010), but the greater picture has to be observed. Lerner & Keltner 
(2000) highlight how emotions that have the same valence, like anger and fear, 
can have a completely different effect on cognitive processes like risk 
perception and preferences. The deeper significance of the diverse emotion 
effects on negotiations is especially evident when one observes the inter-
personal effects of discrete emotions in different negotiation contexts (see e.g. 
Van Kleef et al., 2010) and negotiation phases (see e.g. Barry & Oliver, 1996).  
In the next section we will attempt to describe some of the most important 
positive and negative effects of different discrete emotions.  
 
 
A.3.1 Positive Effects of Emotions 
 
First of all, it is necessary to emphasize that both positive and negative 
emotions can exert a positive influence on a negotiation and its participants 
(see e.g. Kumar, 1997). Thus, we propose to start with the discussion of the 
positive effects of traditionally positive emotions, and then turn to the discussion 
of the positive effects caused by  negative emotions. 
Speaking in general terms, positive emotions tend to affect the decision making 
process positively by inducing positive moods and behaviors, promoting a good 
rapport with the counterpart and fostering a good negotiation environment 
(Kumar, 1997). Moreover, positive affect acts as a signal of the negotiator's 
intentions and therefore is a source of information to the counterpart (Adler et 
al., 1998; Kumar, 1997); increases preferences for cooperation and causes 
higher joint gains and outcomes (Allred et al., 1997; Anderson & Thompson, 
2004; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kumar, 
1997); instigates out-of-the-box thinking which in turn induces the adoption of 
creative problem solving strategies that lead to innovative solutions of 
negotiation issues (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 
1998); facilitates the development of relational commitment and promotes future 
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business relationships (Druckman & Olekalns, 2007; Kopelman et al., 2006; 
Lawler & Yoon, 1993); promotes persistence when dealing with issues of 
ambiguous character and increases the confidence level of the negotiator 
(Kumar, 1997) and increases negotiators' confidence (Kramer, Newton, & 
Pommerenke, 1993). 
Another important effect of positive emotions is the increase of trust between 
negotiators. If a negotiator has trust in the negotiation situation, his counterpart, 
or the fairness and quality of the negotiation outcome, this will lead to more  
cooperative behavior through open information exchange and finally, will result 
in more win-win solutions (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Carnevale & Isen, 
1986). Negotiators that exhibit a lot of positive emotions may be seen by their 
counterparts as more cooperative and trustworthy, which increases trust in the 
relationship and triggers reciprocal exchange of interests and priorities 
(Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Carnevale & Isen, 1986). 
The level of power one possesses may have large implications for the issue of 
trust between negotiators, as less powerful negotiators tend to be more anxious 
about trust than individuals that possess more power. Consequently, the less 
powerful individuals will be constantly looking for signals that they could trust 
the other party (Anderson & Thompson, 2004). Powerful individuals, on the 
other hand,  will be less motivated to look for and process social information 
about others as they will rely mainly on stereotypes and information that is 
consistent with their initial expectations about the partner (Anderson & 
Thompson, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). Since positive 
emotions are a signal of one's trustworthiness, less powerful individuals in a 
power-imbalanced negotiation would be very sensitive to these trust-signals, 
whereas powerful negotiators should be less responsive to the other's positive 
affect. This suggests that powerful individual's positive affect is more efficient in 
predicting trust and integrative outcomes between the negotiators (Anderson & 
Thompson, 2004). 
Not only positive emotions can affect the negotiation positively, negative 
emotions can sometimes benefit the negotiation as well, although this fact used 
to be ignored in the past (Barry et al., 2004). First of all, negative affect sends a 
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signal that the current situation is unhealthy, and consequently motivates the 
parties to make a change (Kumar, 1997). In a negotiation setting, anger can 
serve to highlight the importance of an issue to the counterpart, or it may even 
be used to restore or strengthen a broken relationship (Friedman et al., 2004; 
Kumar, 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Anger works well in bargaining situations 
in cases where the other negotiator's limits are lower and when he/she has less 
alternatives and has more to lose, so the consequences of rejection are high 
(Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). 
There is evidence that negotiators tend to make more concessions when faced 
with an angry as opposed to a neutral or happy counterpart because they 
believe the angry counterpart to be more ambitious in his negotiation goals (Van 
Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b) or because they 
perceived them to be tougher (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006).  Anger therefore may 
be efficient in claiming value and eliciting cooperation (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004b).  
Also, a display of embarrassment or shame can serve a reconciliatory function 
and therefore have a positive effect on the (damaged) relationship (Keltner & 
Buswell, 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000). In cases when a negotiator violates the 
terms of the negotiation, his guilt may motivate him to restore the relationship 
bonds and make him adopt a more cooperative and integrative approach 
(Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Expressing pain or distress 
after being cheated by the other party also induces cooperative behavior from 
the counterpart (Morris & Keltner, 2000). Last but not least, a debilitating 
emotion like jealousy can also have a positive effect  by causing less interest in 
others and consequently promoting  stable committed relationships (Morris & 
Keltner, 2000).  
In line with these findings, we can conclude that different emotions can have a 
positive influence on the way we and our counterparts act and react in 
negotiations and on the relationship that stems from this interaction. 
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A.3.2 Negative Effects of Emotions 
Anger makes dull men witty, but it also keeps them poor.  (Queen Elizabeth I) 
 
As in the case of the positive effects of some emotions mentioned earlier, 
negative effects can be also caused by either positive or negative emotions.  
More specifically, there are a number of positive emotions whose experience or 
expression may affect the negotiation negatively. Adler et al. (1998) argue that 
negotiations usually start off in a pleasant manner, as negotiators look forward 
to claiming value in the future. After they find themselves caught in the 
bargaining process, they might realize that they have acted irrationally. Thus, 
this shows that the negotiator's perception of himself is distorted (Adler et al., 
1998). Negotiators should, therefore, avoid hasty judgements of any kind and 
be aware of the possibility of the so called „negotiator's bias“ which induces the 
feeling of supreme honesty and fairness in negotiators (Adler et al., 1998).  
A similar effect was studied by Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke (1993), who 
found that positive affect tends to enhance self-confidence and self-evaluation 
of performance. Although this so called „self-enhancement bias“ may have 
positive consequences, it may also lead to more problematic negotiations, in 
terms of distorted views of own strategies and behavior and neglect of important 
information from others as a result of the near-sightedness caused by the bias 
(Adler et al., 1998; Thompson, 1990; Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004). It 
has also been found that negotiators in good mood tend to overestimate 
themselves on important attributes, they have higher expectations of their 
counterparts and of the final outcome, which sets them up for failure (Bazerman 
et al., 2000; Carnevale, 2007; Forgas, 1998). Personal ties between negotiators 
may have a similar effect on the negotiation, by fostering high expectations of 
one another that might be impossible to fulfill in the long run (Barry & Oliver, 
1996). Positive affect may also give the negotiator the image of a soft bargainer 
which is not advantageous, especially when the stakes are high and the 
situation calls for tough bargaining (Kumar, 1997). Furthermore, as a result of 
his/her very good mood, a negotiator may be more gullible and susceptible to 
deception and tricks from the other party (Kumar, 1997).   
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Although it has been found that positive affect influences one's ability to solve 
problems creatively (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), 
there is indication that negotiators in a good mood do not use their creativity 
and problem-solving skills to strategically and critically choose a counterpart 
(Barry & Oliver, 1996). Similarly, positive affect causes people to view the world 
more optimistically and  accept arguments that would otherwise be considered 
as weak, whereas people influenced by negative affect tend to be more critical 
in questioning their counterpart's arguments (Kumar, 1997). 
Generally, negotiations characterized by negative emotions are a sign of  
incompatibility between negotiators. Negative emotions, having more 
dimensionality (Barry & Oliver, 1996) and survival potential (Adler et al., 1998), 
establish a dynamic, mutually-reinforcing negative effect on the negotiation as a 
whole, making impasse increasingly possible (Kumar, 1997). When conflicts 
arise as a result of negative emotions, negotiators may hold that his/her 
opponent's actions are not compatible with his/her own goals, which may cause 
even more negative emotions (Obeidi et al., 2005).  
 As far as the negative effects of negative emotions are concerned, the most 
studied emotion in the literature is anger. The reason is that anger is one of the 
strongest and pervasive negative emotions that is often inevitable in conflict 
situations (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Frustration, as a lighter version of anger, 
appears in situations where the achievement of a goal is simply postponed by 
accidence. The difference between anger and frustration is that anger may lead 
to physical violence, whereas frustration only motivates the individual to 
retaliate (Obeidi et al., 2005). Fear, on the other hand, can immobilize the 
negotiator and render him incapable to react in any way. One method often 
used to deal with fear, beside avoidance is the use of anger (Obeidi et al., 
2005). In terms of intrapersonal effects, anger may cause lower regard and 
respect of others' interests and may even influence one's judgements regarding 
those interests (Allred et al., 1997); may result in more competitive and 
distributive strategies and tactics (Mara Olekalns, Smith, & Lau, 2002); and may 
cause negotiators to reject offers and end up with less than optimal deals 
(Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). However, when the expression of anger is 
interpersonal, negotiators tend to evaluate their counterpart and the whole 
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negotiation unfavorably (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b); the 
interpersonal ties get damaged by eliciting fear or anger in the opponent and by 
making a negative impression, which lowers joint  gains, heightens the 
incidence of impasse and affects negatively the will to interact again in the 
future (Allred et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2004; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van 
Kleef & Côté, 2007). Contrary to findings that indicate a positive effect of anger 
on concession making (see e.g. Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006 and  Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b), some studies have found that negotiators are less 
likely to concede to a counterpart that displays negative emotions rather than 
positive emotions and that they might even respond with anger themselves, 
thereby increasing the possibility of an impasse (Friedman et al., 2004; 
Kopelman et al., 2006). Anger is therefore inefficient in creating value and rarely 
leads to reconciliation and mutual agreements, especially when it is 
reciprocated, which is a plausible scenario since expressions of anger are often 
perceived as expressions of hostility and arrogance (Allred et al., 1997; Forgas, 
1998; Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b).  Finally, 
anger affects the will to cooperate together to solve disputes, by motivating the 
parties to focus on ways to retaliate, instead on ways to improve the joint status 
quo (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Thompson & Kim, 2000).   
In conclusion, it is important to keep in mind that positive, as well as negative 
emotions can act as a deterrent to cooperation and successful joint outcomes in 
the negotiation context in a number of different ways.  
 
  
A.4 Emotions in Negotiations: Review of Dominant Approaches 
“Emotions, at their most basic are not only impulses to act, but they are also the 
feelings that trigger these impulses.” (Callahan, 1988) 
 
If we observe the empirical  literature published until now, we can distinguish 
two main approaches to assessing emotions in negotiations: (a) the one 
emphasizing the predictive role of emotions as antecedents of negotiations, and 
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(b) the one focusing on the role of emotions as consequences of negotiations 
(Barry et al., 2004; Morris & Keltner, 2000).  
There is a vast theoretical and empirical body of research that views emotions 
as a behavioral trigger, which as such can be used to predict outcomes (see 
e.g. Butt et al., 2005), however emotions are also often seen as experienced 
consequences of negotiators' behavior (see e.g. Carnevale & Isen, 1986). We 
will address both perspectives in the next two sections of this thesis. 
 
  
A.4.1 Emotion as Antecedent of Negotiation Behavior 
  
In spite of the cognitive perspective of analysis of negotiation behavior and 
outcomes that was popular at the time, it was first suggested by Frijda (1986) 
that emotions in fact lead people to engage in specific behavior affected by the 
person's needs.  Research by Carnevale & Isen (1986) and Sutton & Rafaeli 
(1988), that was published not long after, provide first confirmation of this 
relationship between mood and individuals' behavior and decision making. In 
addition, the new generation of researchers not only supports these findings, 
but also provides further insight into this deep-rooted relationship (see. e.g. 
Allred et al., 1997; Butt et al., 2005; Forgas, 1998; D Keltner, Locke, & Aurain, 
1993; Kramer et al., 1993; Kumar, 1997; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Obeidi et al., 
2005; L. Thompson & Kim, 2000). Hence, it is widely evidentiated that 
emotional states and expressions of negotiating parties can be used to predict 
negotiation outcomes.  
The distinct links between discrete positive and negative emotions and 
individual behavior, information processing and other critical processes that 
people undergo in the negotiation context have been amply researched and 
documented (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Carnevale & 
Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kopelman et al., 2006; Kramer et al., 1993; Kumar, 
1997; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Specifically, positive emotions affect 
information processing, induce creative problem solving, cooperative behavior 
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and concession making (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kramer et al., 
1993), flexibility and concern for the other party (Barry, 2007; Forgas, 1998; 
Schroth, Bain-Chekal, & Caldwell, 2005), which potentially results in integrative 
bargaining behaviors and outcomes (Allred et al., 1997; Barry, 2007; Barry & 
Oliver, 1996) and acts as a predictor of joint gains (Anderson & Thompson, 
2004). On the other hand, negative affect tends to drive people to be more 
competitive, rigid, pessimistic, less creative and less eager to be of help to 
others (Allred et al., 1997; Bazerman et al., 2000; Forgas, 1998; Schroth et al., 
2005).  
In negotiations, frequent interaction with the same actors are very common, 
which often leads to development of relational and affective commitments 
between them (Lawler & Yoon, 1993).  Cooperative behavior and mutually-
beneficial gains that stem from positive emotional regard have been shown to 
have a positive effect on the ongoing and future business relationship (Allred et 
al., 1997; Mara Olekalns et al., 2002). Several scholars have also argued that 
the effects of emotions on the ongoing relationship could even be more 
important than the results of the negotiators' pursuit to claim and create value 
(Allred et al. 1997).   
Since emotions are considered to be a stronger and more intense type of affect 
than mood, we can expect their influence on negotiations to be even more 
pronounced (Allred et al., 1997). Furthermore, emotions provide more 
information than general affective states (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Mood, as a 
prolonged affective state, is presumed to be a situational setting (framing) that 
affects negotiator's actions by altering his perceptions, expectations and 
judgements, and finally his decisions and the final outcome of the negotiations 
(Barry & Oliver, 1996; Carnevale, 2007; Forgas, 1998; Thompson, 1990). 
Literature on emotions thus provides ample  evidence of their predictive role 
that emerges from their ability to predict various cognitive, perceptual and 
behavioral processes that are essential antecedents of negotiation behavior 
(Butt et al., 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In fact, in a study by Butt et al. 
(2005), the authors found that emotions stemming from the negotiator, as well 
as from his counterpart, affect the negotiators’' behavior and negotiation 
outcome directly as a result of this. For example, they found that  negotiator 
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gratitude and counterpart anger reduced personal gains, while joint gains were 
decreased by combinations of negotiator pride-achievement and counterpart 
gratitude and anger emotions (Butt et al., 2005). Hine, Murphy, Weber, & 
Kersten (2009) found that positive linguistic emotional expression can predict e-
negotiation success and Brett et al. (2007) show that expressions of emotions 
through words used in disputes affect the likelihood of agreements. 
Whereas earlier research on mood effects on decision making involved 
conditioning methods or psychological mechanisms and mood manipulations 
(see e.g. Carnevale & Isen, 1986), contemporary research relies mostly on 
cognitive explanations of the affective influences on negotiation. Specifically, 
affect is found to have influence on two cognitive processes: (a) informational 
effects, that arise when mood informs others about what a person is thinking, 
and (b) processing effects, that arise when mood affects the way in which a 
person thinks (Forgas, 1995, 1998).  These are the two fundamental facets of 
the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) proposed by Forgas (1995), which argues that 
affect infusion into people's decisions and judgements influences not only the 
way they process information, but also the way they (re)act and the effect grows 
stronger as the complexity of the situation increases. It is hypothesized that 
mood can either directly influence the negotiation by influencing the level of 
cooperation between the parties or by indirectly affecting their level of cognitive 
flexibility (Forgas, 1995, 1998). 
In Van Kleef et al.'s (2010) Emotions as Social Information Model (EASI), the 
authors emphasize the importance of the social context in which negotiations 
take place for the effects emotions may exert on them. Specifically, they 
propose that the same emotions could have completely different effects in 
predominantly cooperative and competitive settings. According to the model, 
people faced with a counterpart that expresses happiness tend to respond 
similarly when they find themselves in a cooperative setting, whereas in 
competitive settings, people tend to take advantage of their counterpart 
because they perceive his easy-goingness as a sign of a weak bargainer 
(Kumar, 1997). Counterpart's expressions of anger also have a different effect 
depending on the contextual setting. Anger normally reduces cooperation in a 
cooperative context, but it encourages it in competitive settings because anger 
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indicates toughness, ambition and high limits (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van 
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). Emotions do not exert an absolute and 
definitive influence on the negotiation, as highly affective situations often tend to 
greatly depend on the situation itself, rather than on the emotional expressions 
of its participants (Parkinson, 1996). Hence, the predictive effects of emotions 
on negotiations may be mediated by the cooperative/competitive or 
integrative/distributive context in which the emotions are elicited, and only a 
fistful of authors have acknowledged this so far (Carnevale, 2007; Druckman & 
Olekalns, 2007; Lawler & Yoon, 1993; Van Kleef et al., 2010).  
In addition to the effects of emotions we experience, the emotions we express 
to our counterparts influence not only their actions, but their feelings as well, 
which results in the development of a dynamic spiral of  affective influence 
(Hippmann, 2009). The study and analysis of the predictive role of emotions 
may lead to a better understanding of the relational and emotional dynamics 
that occur and may result in the generation of possible solutions of problems 
that arise in the negotiation context.  
 
 
A.4.2 Emotion as Consequence of the Negotiation Interaction 
 
Emotions do not just have a strong predictive characteristic, but they are also 
consequences of events, or even words, that had transpired as a result of the 
negotiation interaction.  As Lupton et al. (2002) notice: „[…] emotions are 
directed at objects and elicited by events.“ (p.85).  In this context, it is important 
to analyze emotions not only as consequences of events in the negotiation that 
affect the individual, but also as consequences of others' emotional expressions 
(Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996). 
Kumar (1997) argues that origins of affect can be grouped into three categories; 
namely, the image one has of his counterpart, the perceived procedural and 
distributive justice, and differences based on the cultural affiliation of negotiating 
parties. The perceived image one has of his/her counterpart is construed by a 
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number of different variables such as status, power, gender, prior experience, 
group membership etc. (Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999).  In a negotiation context, 
should the two parties have the same image (be it positive or negative), they 
are bound to reinforce each other to the point of strengthening the prevalence of 
positive or negative affect in the negotiation (Kumar, 1997). On a similar topic, 
emotions can positively or negatively reinforce others' behavior (i.e. positive 
emotions might be a sign that what was done was correct and one should 
continue in the same manner, whereas negative emotions might signal that 
something is wrong and that an adjustment is required) (Cacioppo & Gardner, 
1999; Van Kleef, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). 
Acknowledging that negotiations are social processes charged with powerful 
emotions, researchers hold that emotions that arise as consequences of 
interpersonal interaction are very likely to be stronger than outcome-based 
emotions (Srull, Berkowitz, & Averill, 1993). Positive affect as a result of prior 
experience with the same counterpart is shown to result in less extreme initial 
offers, but if the positive affect is induced by other factors (e.g. setting, 
disposition), it tends to increase confidence and expectations and results in 
more profitable initial offers (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Similarly, repeated success 
in interactions with the same opponent is likely to generate positive emotional 
reactions and commitment behavior (Lawler & Yoon, 1993).  
A great number of researchers argue that identifiable relational and 
interpersonal problems trigger emotions (Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Lazarus, 1991; 
Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996). For instance, anger can be provoked 
by a meeting that starts late (Adler et al., 1998) or is being interrupted (Morris & 
Keltner, 2000), by being faced with excessive demands, misrepresentation or 
overstepping authority (Adler et al., 1998). Fear is another emotion that arises in 
negotiations in a variety of situations, like bargaining without sufficient 
preparation, interaction with an angry counterpart with superior bargaining 
power or plain insecurity in own abilities (Adler et al., 1998; Morris & Keltner, 
2000).  
Hegtvedt & Killian (1999) investigated the link between emotions and 
perceptions of justice using Homans's (1974) arguments about emotional 
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responses to (in)justice. Homans's (1974) main argument is that when people 
are treated fairly, they will experience positive emotions; if they are under 
rewarded, they will be angry; and if over rewarded, they will feel guilty. While 
these findings concern issues of distributive justice (i.e. fairness of outcomes), 
little research on emotions has been dedicated to concerns of procedural justice 
(i.e. fairness of processes) even though it is presumed to cause more intense 
emotions that last longer than emotions stemming from distributive (in)justice 
(Kumar, 1997). Research on procedural justice found that negotiators who 
perceive the negotiation process as fair are more likely to experience pleasure. 
However, negotiators who are dissatisfied with the fairness of the encounter are 
more likely to express anger and resentment as a result of this (Hegtvedt & 
Killian, 1999). Using an ultimatum game experiment, Pillutla & Murnighan 
(1996) argued that when respondents are informed about the (un)fairness of an 
ultimatum offer, they feel angry, act spitefully and consequently reject the offer. 
Expression of strong emotions however may not only be a consequence of 
conflicts or relational problems, but it also may demonstrate the high importance 
of a specific issue  to one of the negotiators, especially in the case of anger 
expression (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; O’Connor et al., 2002). Finally, 
emotional expressions are almost always triggered by the economic outcomes 
of negotiations, which may influence behavior and the relationship with the 
same counterpart in the future (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Emotions can therefore 
be triggered by a wide variety of events, behavioral and cognitive processes 
and other emotions. Negotiators should be aware of the ways of dealing with 
emotions that hinder their profits and future relationships and of the ways of 
taking advantage of emotions that might benefit them.  
 
 
 
 
A.4.3 An Integrated View of the Two Approaches  
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Both perspectives discussed in the previous chapters emphasize the 
significance of emotions within a negotiation context. „Developing a deeper 
knowledge of the role emotions play in negotiations requires developing an 
understanding of how those emotions are both triggered and communicated“ 
(Schroth et al., 2005 p.124). In line with this rationale, Griessmair & Koeszegi 
(2009) address the specific dynamic of negotiation interaction and deduce that 
successful outcomes are not only a result of positive emotions, but also a cause 
for them. 
These predictive and outcome effects of emotions can often overlap during the 
encounter due to the fact that emotional processes evolve quickly from one 
emotional state to another (Griessmair et al., 2009), therefore requiring that 
emotions be regarded as cause as well as consequence (Scherer, 1986). 
Broekens & Jonker (2010) define emotions as “valenced reactions to events, 
agents, or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the way in 
which the eliciting situation is construed” (p.5).  
While we acknowledge this twofold nature of emotions, we also argue that 
emotions have an inherent dynamic character which cannot be disregarded 
(Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Frijda, 1986; Homans, 1974; Kumar, 1997; Sutton & 
Rafaeli, 1988). That is why we devote our attention to the study of the complex 
emotional patterns that evolve and change throughout different phases of the 
negotiation process.  
 
 
A.5 Relational Aspects of Emotions: Emotional Contagion and 
Reciprocity 
 
A large body of research focused on the effects of an individual's emotions on 
negotiation behavior, strategic behavior, concession making, future business 
relationships and joint gains (see e.g. Allred et al., 1997; Barry & Oliver, 1996; 
Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kumar, 1997), and made a significant 
contribution to emotion research. Nevertheless, these studies do not account for 
28 
 
how one person's emotional behavior is influenced by their counterpart's 
emotions (Barry et al., 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; Van 
Kleef et al., 2010). The acknowledgment of the importance of affective 
processes such as emotional contagion and reciprocity that arise in negotiations 
is crucial for a complete understanding of the interpersonal emotional dynamics 
between negotiators.  
Research shows that people tend to mimic their partner's emotional 
expressions automatically up to the point of feeling what their partner feels. This 
process occurs when people „catch“  the other person's emotions through 
mimicry of their vocal and facial expressions, grimaces, postures and bodily 
movements (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Moll, Jordet, & Pepping, 2010; 
Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2010) or through text-based 
emotional expressions in online negotiations (Friedman et al., 2004; Thompson 
& Nadler, 2002; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). People, therefore, 
tend to „catch“ the emotions of others, which involves actually feeling what the 
other person feels by perceiving and interpreting others' emotions and 
responding similarly (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Thompson et al., 
1999). Contagion research stresses that individuals use various methods to 
gain information about others' emotions, but by paying attention to one's own 
feelings in company of others, individuals can obtain invaluable information 
about others' emotional states (Hatfield et al., 1994).  Kopelman et al. (2006) 
found that the strategic display of emotion will influence the target negotiator's 
actions, judgments and emotions through emotional contagion, but whether 
he/she judges the expressed emotions correctly depends on the type of 
emotion expressed. In their study of the effects of emotional transitions in 
negotiations, Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani (2011) found that perceivers of the 
happy-angry transition of their counterpart, tend to catch the pretransition 
happiness which mediates the subsequent anger in the post transition period 
(p.553). There is also indication that emotions can influence the judgment of 
third-party observers, especially when negotiators' emotions are positive 
(Thompson & Kim, 2000). In fact, evidence suggests that emotional contagion is 
less common in competitive settings, where negotiators usually use strategic 
inferences to obtain information from their counterpart's emotional expressions 
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instead (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b; Van Kleef et al., 2010). In 
cooperative settings, emotional contagion tends to influence social decision 
making and plays a part in facilitating cooperation by expression of positive 
emotions, and undermining it by expression of negative emotions (Barsade, 
2002; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b; Van Kleef et al., 2010). 
Emotional contagion does not only affect individual- or dyad-level behavior, but 
it also has a great effect on the group-level dynamics (Barsade, 2002).  Barsade 
(2002) showed that positive emotional contagion influences cooperation, 
decrease conflicts and improved task performance as perceived by the 
individual and others, whereas negative contagion has the opposite effect. 
Moreover, emotional contagion seems to not only affect the emotions of group 
members, but it also has an effect on the future group dynamics (Barsade, 
2002; Kelly & Barsade, 2001).  
Researchers that investigated the effects of emotional contagion hold that 
emotions can be directly transferred from one individual to another. On the 
other hand, studies of reciprocity in negotiations suggest that emotional 
expressions may provoke corresponding emotional expressions from the other 
party, that in some cases may result in escalated conflicts and conflict spirals 
(Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Parkinson, 1996; Putnam & Jones, 1982).  
Reciprocity occurs when negotiators reciprocate (i.e. return in kind) their 
counterpart's „[…] integrative (win-win) communications (e.g., multi-issue 
offers), distributive (win-lose) communications (e.g., threats), procedural 
statements, and affective statements“ (Brett et al., 1998 p.411; Putnam & 
Jones, 1982; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Because it is considered a 
norm and part of human instinct, understanding the effects of reciprocity is 
considered critical for making a move from distributive to integrative bargaining 
and breaking conflict spirals. (Brett et al., 1998; Butt et al., 2005; Putnam & 
Jones, 1982). The norm suggests that in most cases, a negotiator's cooperative 
behavior will be responded to with cooperativeness, and competitive behavior 
will be responded to with competitiveness (Hatfield et al., 1994; Weingart et al., 
1993). Indeed, when faced with counterpart's integrating, compromising and 
dominating behavior, negotiators tend to respond in a similar manner (Butt et 
al., 2005). However, as hypothesized by Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead 
30 
 
(2004a,b), dominating behavior like the expression of anger can also trigger 
yielding behavior and concession making, which constitute non-reciprocal 
responses. Similarly, it was found that negotiator's yielding triggered dominating 
behavior in the counterpart (Butt et al., 2005). Expression of guilt may also 
induce one to reciprocate with cooperativeness, but it may provoke exploitation 
as well (Van Kleef, 2008).   
Assuming that both emotional contagion and reciprocity work both ways, it is 
reasonable to assume that they might result in an accumulation and escalation 
of emotions of all the participants in the negotiation encounter (Parkinson, 
1996). Thus, there is a need to manage these processes strategically by simply 
not reciprocating contentious statements or combining them with 
noncontentious communications (Brett et al., 1998).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Online Negotiations 
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The increasing need to cope with conflict via multi-issue negotiations coupled 
with the growing pervasiveness of information technology in the last two 
decades, has resulted in a need to understand the technologies that were 
designed to facilitate this process of interaction (Derks, Fischer, & Bos, 2008; 
Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Morris et al., 2002; Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997; 
Thompson & Nadler, 2002). The following chapter dealing with negotiations 
conducted online is intended to outline the recent theories and principles and 
major empirical findings in the literature on this subject.  
Research has shown that emotions are not only part of verbal face-to-face  
(FtF) interaction, but are also found in other forms of human expression like in 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) (Brett et al., 2007; Derks et al., 
2008; Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009). Whether a negotiation is conducted in 
person or using information technologies, it is nevertheless a form of social 
interaction susceptible to emotions. Although there is a wide variety of 
communication technologies that were developed as a result of technological 
breakthroughs in the last couple of decades (e.g. email, IM, video conferencing 
etc.) (Murphy, Lupton, Hine, & Zelenski, 2007), we are mainly interested in 
systems designed to support negotiators (online) during a negotiation because 
of their increased presence and importance in the business world. However, as 
computer-based interaction is a daily routine for most people nowadays, a 
general discussion on the differences between face-to-face (negotiation) 
interaction and computer-mediated communication will be made.  This will 
include the comparison of the ways emotions are communicated in both forms 
of interaction. 
Although a vast number of researchers have emphasized the lack of visual and 
non-verbal cues in negotiations conducted via computer (Derks et al., 2008; 
Thompson & Nadler, 2002; Walther, 1995), recent research has concluded that 
this could be partially offset by the use of non-verbal elements able to convey 
emotions, so called “paralanguage” (Brett et al., 2007; Griessmair & Koeszegi, 
2009; Liu, Ginther, & Zelhart, 2001; Thompson & Nadler, 2002). Moreover, 
characteristics of information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as 
asynchronicity, storage and access makes the use of IT in  complex 
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negotiations much easier and therefore makes up for the potential loss of 
communication channels (Kersten, 2004).  
As it will be presented in the following section, offline (FtF) and online 
negotiations differ in a number of aspects, however the way emotions are 
communicated in both forms of negotiation interaction is strikingly similar (Derks 
et al., 2008).   
 
 
B.1 Online Text-Based vs. Face-to-Face Negotiations 
 
Online text-based negotiations differ from face-to-face negotiations on a number 
of contextual and structural factors (Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006; Rangaswamy 
& Shell, 1997; Walther, 1995). There have been mixed findings as to the 
differences in their influence on negotiation outcomes, which implies that 
computer-mediated communication must have some effect on the negotiation 
process and that these effects have to be investigated and brought to the 
negotiators' attention. Nevertheless, research outlines that CMC is not worse 
than FtF communication and that it may even be more effective if used correctly 
(Kato & Akahori, 2005; Walther, 1995).  
The first and most cited difference between online and FtF negotiations is the 
lack of certain visual and non-verbal cues in online negotiations (Daft & Lengel, 
1986; Derks et al., 2008; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999; Murphy 
et al., 2007; Thompson & Nadler, 2002; Walther, 1992, 1995). Non-verbal cues 
in this context are the facial expressions, gestures, eye-contact and certain 
paralinguistic, sociological and psychological features that become visible to the 
environment as a result of interaction and are not transferrable by text. Early 
research has emphasized that the physical distance of negotiators in online 
settings, as well as the textual nature of their communication result in more 
explicit, socially inappropriate and disinhibited behavior than in FtF negotiations 
(Derks et al., 2008; Kato & Akahori, 2005; Moore et al., 1999; Pesendorfer & 
Koeszegi, 2006; Thompson & Nadler, 2002). As a result, online negotiations 
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were believed to be more task-oriented when compared to FtF negotiations 
which are considered more social-emotion oriented (Liu et al., 2001). In 
addition, they were considered to be less friendly, emotional and personal and 
more serious and formal (Foroughi, Perkins, & Jelassi, 1991; Pesendorfer & 
Koeszegi, 2006; Walther, 1995) and were therefore likely to contain more 
threats and ultimatums than FtF negotiations (Thompson & Nadler, 2002). The 
rationale for this states that compared to FtF negotiations, online negotiations 
lack spontaneity and usually last longer.  As a result, negotiators have more 
time to review their messages, control their emotional expressions and focus on 
the task at hand rather than on the development of social relationships with their 
counterparts (Foroughi et al., 1991; Kersten, 2004; Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 
2006; Walther, 1995). Even though this rationale has been contested by a 
number of studies (see e.g. Liu et al., 2001 and Walther, 1995), it still remains a 
general view in literature.  
There is also indication that information is exchanged more freely in FtF settings 
compared to online settings, because people in physical proximity of each other 
interact more frequently, and recognize and address conflicts much faster than 
people that are physically distant (Morris et al., 2002; Thompson & Nadler, 
2002). In fact, (Thompson & Nadler, 2002) found that participants in FtF 
negotiations exchange more than three times more information than participants 
in online negotiations. „People talk faster than they write or type“ (Thompson & 
Nadler, 2002 p.112), which is why online interactions evolve more slowly than 
FtF interactions and online negotiators require more time to transmit task and 
social-emotion oriented information (Liu et al., 2001; Walther, 1992, 1995). As 
Walther  (1992) proposed in his Social Information Processing Model, time is a 
crucial factor for the development of online interpersonal relationships, but as 
soon as these are established, they may contain the same qualities as FtF 
relationships.  In fact, online interaction may even help to establish relationships 
that normally would not have formed due to geographic distances, culture or 
group affiliation (Walther, 1992).  
Anonymity is another common characteristic of CMC, whereas in FtF it is 
difficult to hide one's identity, gender culture etc. In fact, several studies have 
shown that visual anonymity and isolation typical for online negotiations tends to 
34 
 
encourage more self-disclosure of personal information than in FtF settings 
(Joinson, 2001; Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006). The propensity to disclose 
personal information is found to decrease as the anonymity of participants 
decreases (e.g. use of video camera in negotiations).  
Murphy et al. (2007) provide an alternative characterization of the differences 
between communication in FtF and online negotiations, which includes: 
synchronicity, symbol variety, rehearsability and reprocessability. While 
participants in FtF negotiations receive instant feedback from their counterparts, 
participants of online negotiations have control over when a message will be 
sent and therefore read by their counterpart, which is a characteristic of 
asynchronicity. Symbol variety refers to the amount of available channels and 
cues of communication (Murphy et al., 2007). Whereas in FtF negotiations 
people can communicate through auditory and visual channels, which allow for 
communication of various linguistic and paralinguistic cues, in online 
negotiations there is only one communication channel available – text 
messaging. Nevertheless, communication of both linguistic and paralinguistic 
cues is possible through e.g. punctuation, use of emoticons, word spacing, 
intentional misspelling and capitalization.  Online communication is typically 
known to be higher in rehearsability than FtF communication, independent of 
whether the communication mode is highly synchronous or asynchronous. 
Participants in online negotiations have the possibility to reformulate their 
messages and thus have more control over what they communicate to their 
counterparts. Reprocessability allows participants in negotiations to revisit 
previously sent and received messages. In FtF negotiations, negotiators have 
no other way to remember the details of the encounter other than to rely on their 
own memory, which is commonly affected by recall biases. On the other hand, 
messages in online negotiations can be saved, revisited and reprocessed at 
any time (Murphy et al., 2007).  
 
 
B.2 Emotions in Online Negotiations 
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Murphy et al. (2007) argue that the „[...] introduction of technology may not 
change how we experience emotions, rather, we contend that it is more likely to 
shape the information with which we base our emotional reactions and 
judgements“ (p.86). This is due to the fact that the underlying processes that 
drive emotional behavior is the same online as in FtF interaction and, as people 
tend to adapt to whatever environment they find themselves in, they interact 
using the tools made available by the medium of communication in their efforts 
to convey social-emotional information to others (Murphy et al., 2007; Walther, 
1992, 1995). As in every form of human interaction, conflicts are likely to occur 
in online negotiations as well. Therefore, emotions are bound to arise in this 
negotiation environment as in any other (Derks et al., 2008; Hine et al., 2009). 
The following chapters will provide a detailed summary of the major theories 
and empirical findings in the literature.  
 
 
B.2.1 Relational Communication in an Online Setting 
For good or ill, the Internet is a profoundly social medium. (Walther & Parks, 2002) 
 
Earlier research produced inconsistent findings as to the relational nature of 
CMC. It was first viewed as an impersonal and unemotional medium (Derks et 
al., 2008; Walther, 1992, 1995), however recent research holds that online 
interactions are highly influenced by the social context (e.g. group norms), 
which influences the interpretation of messages and the shaping of responses 
(Murphy et al., 2007). Therefore the social context in which online negotiations 
evolve results in interpersonal relationship development  which is largely 
influenced by the formation of personal impressions about one's communication 
partner (Liu et al., 2001).  Considering the importance of social cues in the 
formation of personal impressions (see e.g. Liu et al., 2001; Walther, 1992), 
their transmission in an online setting might bear more value than it would in a 
FtF setting (Joinson, 2001; Liu et al., 2001; Murphy et al., 2007).  
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Moore et al. (1999) postulate that in e-mail negotiation encounters, conflict 
spirals are more likely to occur due to fostered mistrust between the 
negotiators. However, this effect might be mediated by the existence of 
previous rapport between the negotiators, such as group affiliation or mutual 
self-disclosure before the online encounter (Moore et al., 1999). They also 
argue that while common group affiliation might result in a more rational form of 
rapport and cooperation,  mutual exchange of personal information  is likely to 
be more emotional in nature. On a similar note, it was found that more 
relationship-focused interaction, which is also known as „schmoozing“ (Moore et 
al., 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Morris et al., 2002) seems to be missing in 
online negotiations. Results from experiments by Moore et al. (1999) show that 
negotiators who make efforts to build rapport provoke more positive emotions 
and trust in their counterparts. Online negotiations between students from the 
same university were found to less likely end in an impasse, which provides 
proof of the advantages of same group membership for the outcome of online 
negotiations (Moore et al., 1999). Therefore,  it may be more difficult to identify 
the emotions of our online negotiation counterpart,  because of anonymity, 
distance, non disclosure of information or the absence of certain nonverbal cues 
(Derks et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2001; Murphy et al., 2007; Thompson & Nadler, 
2002; Walther, 1995). However, as in every form of interaction, relationship 
building can also occur in online negotiations because people tend to adapt to 
the restrictions of the communication channel they are faced with in any way 
possible (Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006).  
If anonymity is a precondition of online interaction, it is interesting to know how 
this affects the identification and interpretation of messages (Derks et al., 2008). 
Nonverbal cues that are displayed in FtF interactions have a number of social 
functions. First of all, they help reduce the ambiguity that sometimes 
accompanies emotion expression in online communication, and they strengthen 
or alleviate a certain emotion that is being expressed (Lee & Wagner, 2002). 
Therefore, due to the the lack of certain cues in CMC some emotional 
expressions are likely to be over- or underestimated, which in the case of 
negative emotions might lead to conflict spirals (Derks et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, recent research has shown that this missing information might be 
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compensated for by a more explicit and direct way of expressing emotional 
states than in traditional FtF encounters (Derks et al., 2008; Nadler & 
Shestowsky, 2006) or by using emoticons that to some extent portray facial 
expressions (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Lupton et al., 2002; Murphy et al., 
2007; Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006). Such „emotional icons“ may likely have 
similar functions as nonverbal cues in FtF interaction, as they also help to 
intensify an emotional expression (Derks, Bos, & Von Grumbkow, 2007; 
Walther & D’Addario, 2001) and communicate social-emotional information 
(Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009). Along with the identification of other social cues 
present in CMC (e.g. chronemics), recent studies have shown that negotiators 
can use these not only to communicate emotions, but also to inform about one's 
intentions, values and psychological states (Brett et al., 2007). Moreover, it is 
hypothesized that negotiators' judgements may form more quickly as a result of 
information conveyed by emoticons than from information conveyed using 
purely linguistic cues (Murphy et al., 2007).  
According to the way in which they view the difference in relations caused by 
media characteristics, all theoretical models that deal with affect and CMC can 
be categorized into two opposing perspectives: the Cues-Filtered-Out, and the 
Cues- Filtered-In perspective.  
 
 
B.2.1.1 The Cues-Filtered-Out Perspective 
 
According to this perspective also referred to as the pessimistic view, which was 
dominant in the 1980s, the CMC environment acts as a restraint to the 
transmission of nonverbal cues. Therefore, CMC is seen as a more task-
oriented medium that fosters anti-normative, depersonalized and disinhibited 
social behavior that prevents relationship building between users (Derks et al., 
2008; Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Liu et al., 2001; Pesendorfer & Koeszegi, 
2006; Walther, 1992, 1995).  
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Most of the earlier research on interpersonal interaction in CMC sided with the 
cues-filtered-out perspective (Liu et al., 2001; Walther, 1995). Within this 
perspective, three major theories were developed: the Social Presence Theory, 
the Lack of Social Cues Hypothesis and the Media Richness Theory.  
At the basis of the Social Presence Theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) is 
the argument that the presence of fewer communication channels and cues in 
CMC causes less attention being paid to the social presence of others. Social 
presence in this sense is defined as a feeling of the other person's involvement 
in the interaction (Walther, 1995). Since CMC is considered to be devoid of 
certain nonverbal cues, it is hypothesized that the feeling of social presence will 
be reduced in this medium of communication compared to FtF communication. 
The decrease of perceived social presence is said to cause more impersonal 
communication between participants (Lupton et al., 2002; Walther, 1995).  
Sproull & Kiesler's (1986) Lack of Social Cues Hypothesis posits that the 
absence of social information represented by aspects of the physical 
environment and nonverbal cues in CMC causes more uninhibited and 
antinormative behavior. Other expected effects include swearing, hostile 
language, insults and self-absorption. 
The Media Richness Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986) is concerned with the 
bandwidth (i.e. the number of available cues) of communication and information 
exchange within different media (Murphy et al., 2007). Consequently, face-to-
face communication is considered to be the richest media as it allows for 
immediate feedback and the communication of the largest number of verbal and 
nonverbal cues. The theory proposed that managers should use the richer 
media to communicate highly ambiguous information and other less rich media, 
such as CMC, for more explicit communications. However, later studies have 
shown that media characteristics cannot always predict the choice or the 
success of the communication channel (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Murphy 
et al., 2007; Walther, 1995).  
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B.2.1.2 The Cues-Filtered-In Perspective 
 
This so called optimistic view was developed as a result of criticism on behalf of 
the cues-filtered-out perspective. Namely, it was found that media-
characteristics are not the only factors that influence the patterns of interaction 
and its success, but there are other task-related characteristics that should be 
considered as well (Murphy et al., 2007).  
According to the Social Information Processing (SIP) theory proposed by  
Walther (1992), the crucial factor that influences the communication of relational 
cues in CMC is time, not capability (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Liu et al., 
2001). The limited bandwidth of CMC allows for less information to be 
exchanged for the same amount of time as does FtF interaction and slows 
down the processes of impression formation and relationship development 
(Walther, 1992, 1995). Walther argues that, given enough time, CMC will be as 
suitable for relational communication as FtF communication (Griessmair & 
Koeszegi, 2009). The core assumption of the SIP theory is that social-emotional 
information can be conveyed in CMC interaction not only via the participants' 
adaptation to the constraints of the medium, but through a longer exchange of 
information that eventually results in interpersonal relationship development. In 
fact, according to a later study by Walther (1995) CMC was found to be no less 
intimate or social-emotion-oriented than FtF communication. Furthermore, there 
is indication that CMC is more formal and aggressive in the beginning of a 
relationship, but it becomes less formal and task-oriented as participants 
exchange a greater number of messages, finally reaching levels of relational 
communication similar to FtF communication (Liu et al., 2001; Walther, 1995). 
Walther (2002) argues that earlier studies pertaining to the cues-filtered-out 
view did not provide participants of CMC experiments with enough time to 
exchange messages, which is why they revealed disadvantages compared to 
FtF communication.  
Hence, negotiations that are administered via CMC contain both task-oriented 
and social-emotion oriented communication and allow for the transmission of 
emotional cues (Liu et al., 2001). The cues-filtered-in perspective postulates 
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that social-emotional information in CMC is exchanged through  “[…] content, 
style, and timing of verbal messages online“ (Walther & Parks, 2002 p.535). 
Specifically, several recent studies have shown that CMC users communicate 
both verbal as well as certain nonverbal cues (Derks et al., 2008; Liu et al., 
2001; Murphy et al., 2007; Walther, 1992). These cues can convey distinct 
emotions and they include the use of emoticons, the capitalization or repetition 
of letters, punctuation,  frequency and duration of interaction and chronemics 
(timing of message exchange) (Brett et al., 2007; Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; 
Liu et al., 2001). For example, an emotional message sent by night signals 
more intimacy than an emotional message sent by day, and a task-oriented 
message sent by night conveys less intimacy than when it is sent by day (Liu et 
al., 2001). As pointed out by Liu et al. (2001), these elements of CMC constitute 
a certain paralanguage which is able not only to convey social-emotional 
information, but it also helps to identify the communication style of a certain 
person, which may in turn help to draw conclusions about his/her personality 
traits, values and intentions (Brett et al., 2007).  
The expression of social cues in CMC is not as direct, so their detection might 
take longer in online settings than it would in FtF communication (Nadler & 
Shestowsky, 2006). However, recent empirical studies provide evidence for the 
cues-filtered-in perspective and support the notion of the social-emotional 
orientation of CMC (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009; Liu et al., 2001; Lupton et al., 
2002; Murphy et al., 2007).  
 
 
B.3 Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs) and e-Negotiation Systems 
(eNSs) 
The potential of ICT is much more than just communication. (Kersten, 2004 p.6) 
Our focus in this study is on the communication of emotions in online 
negotiations that are supported by electronic negotiation support systems 
(eNSs). However, most of the research in this field has neglected the role of 
emotions that inevitably arise during the process of online negotiations, as their 
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main focus seems to lie on the comparison of various communication media or 
communication modes and the outcomes of online negotiations (Pesendorfer & 
Koeszegi, 2005). 
The development of eNS software was put forth after years of research on CMC 
due to the growing need to negotiate and the increasing complexity of issues to 
be negotiated about online (Foroughi et al., 1991). Furthermore, these support 
systems were developed thanks to the valuable insights from decision making, 
game theory and negotiation analysis (Braun et al., 2005). When the issues or 
some other aspects of an online negotiation are too demanding, there is a need 
for objective support that helps decision makers (negotiators) reduce their 
cognitive load by quantitatively analyzing each message and suggesting 
solutions to the problems (Schoop, 2010). Schoop (2010) also points out that 
negotiations often involve the transfer of documents such as contracts that need 
to be formally documented and archived. Document management is yet another 
feature of software designed to support online negotiations.  
While a decision support system (DSS) is oriented towards helping the 
individual understand his/her preferences and search for solutions, a 
negotiation support system (NSS) is highly process-oriented, as it helps the 
negotiators understand each other's preferences and priorities, provides 
constructive advice for conflict resolution and suggests possibilities of mutually 
satisfactory agreements between them (Kersten, 2004; Kersten & Lai, 2007; 
Weber, Kersten, & Hine, 2006). As Kersten (2004) points out, both of these 
systems are comprised in a broader term called an e-negotiation system (eNS), 
which is „[…] software that employs Internet technologies, is deployed on the 
web, and has one or more of the following capabilities:  
1. Supports decision- and concession-making;  
2. Suggests offers and agreements;  
3. Assesses and criticizes offers and counteroffers;  
4. Structures and organizes the process;  
5. Provides information and expertise;  
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6. Facilitates and organizes communication;  
7. Aids agreement preparation; and  
8. Provides access to negotiation knowledge; experts, mediators or facilitators“ 
(p.4). 
Therefore, some less complex media channels such as email and IM can be 
defined as eNSs too (Moore et al., 1999), but they are characteristic for 
computer-facilitated negotiations as they only allow for communication, storage 
and access to information (Kersten & Lai, 2007). However, these do not include 
advanced support tools typical for computer-supported negotiations that expand 
the abilities of negotiation participants to understand the problem and find 
suitable solutions for it by providing them with information that they would 
otherwise not be able to possess (Kersten, 2004; Kersten & Lai, 2007).  
 
 
B.3.1 Emotions and NSS: How to Elicit Emotions from Text? 
 
Studies of online negotiations showed that negotiators' decisions, judgments 
and strategies are influenced by cognition, as well as by emotion and that the 
messages exchanged during such negotiations thus transmit both cognitive and 
emotional information (Hine et al., 2009; Sokolova & Lapalme, 2010). Since 
online negotiations are mostly text-based, and therefore characterized by a lack 
of certain nonverbal cues, negotiators must rely on words to extract meaning 
from messages they receive from their counterparts (Brett et al., 2007; Hine et 
al., 2009; Schroth et al., 2005; Sokolova & Lapalme, 2010). Text, and thus 
written language is an important tool in electronic negotiations (Sokolova & 
Lapalme, 2010). Therefore, negotiators have to pay special attention to the 
wording of messages they receive and send, because it may well be the only 
source of additional information in the online negotiation over which the 
negotiator may have some control.   
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Sokolova & Lapalme (2010) studied the informativeness of negotiation 
messages (i.e. the amount of information conveyed by a message) and its link 
to negotiation outcomes. They argue that information given via a message is 
made up of said information, linguistic meanings and the context of the 
message and that pragmatic cues (e.g. adjectives, adverbs, conjunctions, 
cognition verbs, cardinal numbers etc.) are able to make up for the absence of 
visual cues in text-based online negotiations. Similarly, Griessmair & Koeszegi 
(2009) argue that messages exchanged in such a negotiation environment 
rarely convey only one clear meaning, but they should be further analyzed to 
uncover the other communicative layers that also implicitly convey emotions. In 
this way, messages with the same factual information may convey contrasting 
emotional information when negotiators choose to use different  lexical and 
syntactical constructions (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009).  Therefore, these 
studies further support the notion of the social-emotional orientation of 
electronic negotiations.  
Moreover, the empirical results in Sokolova & Lapalme (2010) indicate that 
negotiation outcomes can be predicted early in the negotiation by paying 
attention to the informativeness signals in the exchanged messages. For 
instance, they found that the most informative signal in the first half of the 
negotiation is the word „your“, and that when it is accompanied by „it“ and „can“ 
in the first half of the message exchange, there is a high probability of success. 
On a similar note, Brett et al. (2007) found that words expressing the giving or 
attacking face in online negotiations influence the likelihood of settlement; and 
Hine et al.'s (2009) study shows that there is significantly more agreeable and 
less negative language in successful e-negotiations compared to failed e-
negotiations.  
Thus, the language used in text-based negotiations provides not only factual 
information about the sender, but also contains layers of emotional content 
which are a source of additional information regarding the sender, his 
preferences and states and the situation in general. In conclusion, the possibility 
to convey emotions in text-based online messages is not impossible, as 
previously believed. In fact, the elicitation of emotions in online settings is 
possible due to the emotional layers implicitly conveyed by text. 
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C) Empirical Analysis 
 
 
C.1) Motivation and Research Questions 
 
In the present study we are interested in the influences of decision support 
systems (DSS) and negotiation support systems (NSS) on the negotiation 
process. Specifically, we direct special attention to the emotional dynamics that 
arise in negotiations and to the ways in which they shape the negotiation 
process mediated by a Negotiator Assistant. Consequently, we have organized 
our work in three research questions.  
RQ 1: What is the impact of DSS on emotional behavior of negotiators?  
Although a vast number of studies addressed the topic of the effects of decision 
support in the last decade, we have identified a gap in the literature as far as 
the study of the relationship between decision support and emotional behavior 
is considered. So far it has, for instance, been shown that decision support 
improves decision making efficiency and effectiveness (Singh & Ginzberg, 
1996), information processing (Delaney, Foroughi, & Perkins, 1997) and 
fairness by promoting integrative behavior (Perkins, Hershauer, Foroughi, & 
Delaney, 1996). Duncan & Barrett (2007) argue that any kind of cognitive input, 
like the additional „rational“ information provided by DSS, has the tendency to 
impact emotional behavior. We therefore inspect whether the existence of 
additional information and assistance provided by the decision support (DSS) 
influences the negotiators' emotions and overall negotiation behavior and 
outcomes. 
RQ 2: What kinds of emotional patterns arise in negotiations that eventually end 
in agreement and those that end in an impasse?  
We  acknowledge that emotions are dynamic by nature and that they tend to 
evolve from moment to moment (Scherer, 1986; Daniel Shapiro, 2002). The 
literature mostly addresses emotions as static predictors or consequences, 
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neglecting their dynamic nature. Kumar (1997) and Morris & Keltner (2000) both 
propose several emotional stages though which the negotiation evolves over 
time. By understanding the complex dynamics of emotional interplay, we 
believe negotiators can begin to understand how they can affect the negotiation 
process with their own behavior and communication styles. Griessmair & 
Koeszegi (2009) provide proof that successful and failed negotiations evolve 
differently and involve a broad range of emotions. However, a dynamic 
perspective of emotions in combination with the effects of negotiation support 
has not yet been investigated. Within this research question, we primarily aim to 
identify the specific emotional dynamics that are characteristic for failed and 
successful negotiations with and without DSS. 
RQ 3: Does the timing of use of the Negotiator Assistant influence the emotional 
behavior of negotiators?  
Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs) have been shown to improve joint gains 
and perception of negotiation climate,  increase fairness, satisfaction and lead 
to more balanced contracts (Delaney et al., 1997; Foroughi, 2011; Foroughi et 
al., 1991; Perkins et al., 1996; Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997). However, there is 
an identifiable gap in the literature, represented by the lack of empirical studies 
investigating the direct effects of the use of a Negotiator Assistant on the 
emotional behavior of negotiators. We investigate whether the use of a 
Negotiation Support System, specifically a Negotiator Assistant (NA) in a 
specific phase influences the emotional behavior of negotiators. To the best of 
our knowledge, the paper by Kersten (2004) is the only one that mentions the 
link between NSS and negotiator behavior. He assumes that NSS positively 
influences the relationship between negotiators, that is „[...] exemplified with 
their positive emotions“ (p.15). However, so far no empirical findings exist, 
which is why we are motivated to inspect this relationship empirically and in 
detail.  
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C.2) Data Collection & Participants 
 
Data used for the purposes of this study is obtained from 57 dyadic online-
negotiations executed with help of the Negoisst Negotiation Support System, 
and performed by 114 students from the University of Tilburg (The Netherlands) 
and the University of Vienna (Austria) enrolled in International Negotiation 
courses. For the purpose of this empirical analysis, relevant data from a 
simulated negotiation experiment called Mihalits AG – Metallurg Technologies 
Joint Venture was used. 
 
C.2.1) Negoisst System & VienNa 2.0  
 
Negoisst is a complex Web-based electronic negotiation support system which 
allows for multi-attributive, bilateral negotiations. The system integrates 
Semantic Web technologies and allows for pragmatic enrichment of the 
sender’s intentions. Therefore, it is always clear whether a message is a formal 
offer or an informal question. Although it integrates analytic functions as well, 
the system mainly focuses on the support of the communication processes. The 
system is offered in two versions, with and without decision support. It is 
therefore used in trainings and negotiation simulations and experiments as a 
negotiation support system (NSS) and, if possible, as a decision support system 
(DSS). We will go further into the definition of these specific terms later on. 
The underlying integrated components of Negoisst are documentation support, 
communication support and, if provided, decision support.  While the 
documentation support tool offers the automatic storage and archiving of 
negotiation messages, generation of contract versions and the linking of 
contract versions to the negotiation messages, the communication support tool 
uses a strictly alternating protocol (Figure 1) where negotiator A can only send a 
message to negotiator B when it is his turn and notification to both is done via e-
mail. Communication support also allows for semantic (definitions and relations) 
and pragmatic (intentions) enrichment of messages. Therefore, it is possible to 
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have a distinct representation of the negotiation issues which are clearly defined 
in the system and are shown in the negotiation agenda. Also, message types 
are defined a-priori, so that the receiver knows whether he is receiving an offer/ 
counteroffer/question etc. or whether he is requested to give clarification on an 
issue.  
 
Figure 1: Alternating Negotiation Protocol 
Adapted from: PPT Presentation „Negotiation Simulation – Introduction to Negoisst and VienNa 2.0” by the 
Chair for Business Informatics (University of Hohenheim) and the Department for Labor Science and 
Organization (Vienna University of Technology) 
 
The decision support tool offers assistance with reflecting one’s preferences 
and with the verification of the achievements and progress of the negotiation in 
an objective manner. The use of decision support does not influence the 
negotiation directly, since it is not visible to the negotiation partner. A typical use 
of decision support is, for instance, the calculation of individual utility functions 
at a given point in the negotiation based on the preferences and weightings one 
has given to the negotiation issues. This function calculates the individual utility 
value for every offer received or sent and, in this way, helps the negotiator to 
have an idea of his/her own progress in the negotiation.  
Each negotiation is comprised of two randomly assigned parties (in this case - 
students) engaging in negotiations with each other. Once the parties log-in 
using the log-in data provided by the administrators/teachers, they are required 
to edit their preference model, i.e. decide upon the relative importance of the 
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attributes/issues to negotiate. This can vary between 0% and 100%. 
Participants in negotiation simulations are usually given best case (Aspiration 
Level) and worst case (Reservation Level) values and ratings of attribute 
importance a-priori. The relative importance of attributes must add up to 100% 
in total. At this point, the negotiation can begin and it may be initiated by either 
party. Every party has the possibility to send personal messages and/or 
personalized negotiation agendas with desired attribute values to her 
counterpart. Offers can be either partial or fully defined.    
As in most cases of human communication, conflicts between the involved 
parties in online negotiations are also inevitable. For the purpose of resolution 
or mitigation of these conflicts the negotiators can use a Negotiator Assistant 
(NA), in this case called Vienna Negotiator Assistant - VienNA 2.0.  VienNa is 
an e-mediation system which acts as a neutral expert and helps with: reflecting 
on the negotiation process, identifying the most conflicting aspects, identifying 
one’s level of flexibility, enhancing understanding of the conflict situation and 
making projections of the possible outcomes of negotiations. The system 
therefore provides functions that are usually performed by a mediator i.e. (i) the 
appraisal of the progress of the negotiation towards or away from an agreement 
by posing the negotiating parties a set of questions to retrieve necessary 
information as well as graphical representation of their flexibility, (ii) analysis of 
the causes of potential impasse situations and (iii) gives advice in form of 
recommendations to overcome impasses based on the previously derived 
diagnosis and analysis.   
A party can ask for assistance from VienNa and thereby initiate a mediation 
round at any point during the negotiation, as well as at the end of the 
negotiation. VienNa then proceeds by giving the parties two questionnaires to 
fill in, in order to acquire as much information about the problem at hand as 
possible. One questionnaire concerns the most conflicting issue and the other is 
about the negotiation process. Once both parties have filled in their 
questionnaires, they can see the combined results for that VienNa round, 
including the Flexibility Grid, interpretation of one’s position in the grid and 
important questions, one’s answers and the derived advice on the basis of 
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those answers. After having completed one mediation round, one can create a 
new round with a new issue or create a new round with a pre-existing issue. 
After an offer is accepted or rejected, there is no way back and VienNa is 
activated automatically for the last time.  
 
C.2.2) Case Description: Mihalits AG – Metallurg Technologies Joint 
Venture 
 
The data used for the purposes of this study is derived from a simulated 
negotiation case known as the Mihalits – Metallurg negotiation case. The 
simulation involves two fictional companies: Mihalits AG, an Austrian aircraft 
manufacturer and Metallurg Technologies, Ukrainian producer of military 
aircrafts. The negotiating parties acted as representatives of either one of these 
two companies and their assignment was to negotiate a deal with their partners 
following instructions given by their board of directors as far as specific issues 
were concerned. The pre-defined agenda issues were:   share of future 
revenue, number of directors in board, secrecy clause, duration of contract, 
payment of “common workers”, additional compensation Ukrainian workers and 
court of jurisdiction.  Negotiators are informed that there are other potential JV 
partners and other business opportunities, although less profitable, for their 
respective companies, which implies that the negotiation does not necessarily 
have to end in agreement. 
 
C.3) Data Analysis 
 
The upcoming chapter is structured as follows. In chapter C.3.1, we will 
describe the procedure for emotion elicitation from text-based messages, which 
is based on a rating process via which negotiation messages are sorted into 
piles according to emotional similarity. The obtained similarity ratings are 
subsequently analyzed with a Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) algorithm, which 
will be further elaborated in chapters C.3.2 and C.3.3.  
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C.3.1) Procedure 
 
As previously mentioned, the data used in the empirical part of this thesis was 
derived from a text-based negotiation simulation carried out with help of 
student-dyads who acted as representatives of one of the two companies 
(Mihalits or Metallurg) pursuing the best possible conditions for a joint venture.  
For the present research we used 57 negotiations, which means that 114 
negotiators in total were negotiating.  The average age, average English 
knowledge and negotiation experience, as well as the distribution of male and 
female negotiators were in line with the needs of the experiment, so that a 
smooth line of action was guaranteed (Table 1). 
 
57 negotiations = 57 dyads = 114 negotiators 
32 negotiations with DSS  
25 negotiations without DSS 
Gender  48% women 52% men 
Age  average = 24,05  
English knowledge (average) 3,9 on a scale of 1 - 5  
Negotiation experience (average) 2,58 on a scale of 1 - 5  
                                              
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Negotiator Characteristics 
 
The 71 students’ (from now on referred to as raters) role was to provide us with 
objective ratings of emotional similarity of all the negotiation messages. They 
were divided into 3 groups for the simple reason that it reduces the workload for 
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them. Also, since we expect similar results for each of the individual groups, it 
allows for cross-validation of the results.  
 
Group 1 
28 raters 
Group 2 
21 rater 
Group 3 
22 raters 
19 negotiations 
(250 messages) 
19 negotiations 
(245 messages) 
19 negotiations 
(235 messages) 
Agreement No 
Agreement 
Agreement No 
Agreement 
Agreement No 
Agreement 
13 
negotiations 
6 negotiations 13 
negotiations 
6 negotiations 12 
negotiations 
7 negotiations 
192 messages 58 messages 172 messages 73 messages 154 messages 81 message 
 
Table 2: Group Overview 
 
In order to obtain the data required for our MDS analysis, we randomly 
assigned the negotiations to our 3 groups of student-raters (every group was 
given the same number of negotiations to rate - 19) and we asked the students 
to rate and describe in a few words or phrases every message of the 
negotiations they were assigned.  
Packages containing randomized messages (each on a single piece of paper) 
and an instruction sheet were handed out to the raters.  They were asked to 
begin with analyzing the content of one message and start building a first pile of 
messages representing a specific emotion. Further on, they were asked to pick 
another random message and either assign it to the already existing pile, or 
form a new pile, depending on the emotional content of the message. The 
possible number of piles was not limited. The raters were required to proceed in 
the same manner until all the messages had been assigned to the appropriate 
emotional piles. Finally, we asked the raters to shortly describe the emotional 
content of each pile, as well as to rate its emotional strength on a Likert-type 
scale from 1 to 7 (1 meaning very positive emotions, 4 being emotionally 
neutral, and 7 representing very negative emotions). Instructions were to 
underline, and therefore distinguish the words or phrases that they considered 
crucial for their judgment call.  
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Ideally, after this procedure, every rater would have divided the messages in 
piles according to their emotional similarity.   
 
 
C.3.2) Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) 
 
For the present analysis we applied Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS has 
been employed in negotiation research, as well as in the analysis of emotions in 
the past (see e.g. Barrett & Fossum, 2001; Kring, Barrett, & Gard, 2003; 
Russell, 1980; Russell & Bullock, 1986). This technique is particularly useful in 
emotion analysis because emotional dimensions are not subject to hierarchical 
taxonomy. Because of its inductive, as opposed to deductive, nature, MDS does 
not limit our analysis to previously defined dimensions, but it enables us to 
apply a more open approach. Basically, it is a data-reduction technique that 
gives us information on how and why variables are related by uncovering the 
spatial representation that defines behavioral data (Pinkley et al., 2005).  
Thus, MDS allows us to uncover the “hidden structure” of data in forms of 
multiple dimensions that distinguish one type of stimuli from another (Pinkley et 
al., 2005). This proves to be particularly meaningful in our case, because one 
message can be explained by more than one emotion. This characteristic of 
emotions is also called data fuzziness, and can be accounted for by using MDS. 
However, we will discuss it later on.  
 
 
C.3.3) Method 
 
For the purposes of this study, we applied multidimensional scaling in a 
qualitative-quantitative research design. The first step, as required by the MDS 
technique, was the determination of the number of dimensions, as well as their 
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interpretation. To do this, first of all, we had to construct a similarity matrix for all 
3 groups of negotiations, described in detail in chapter C.3.1. This can be 
interpreted as a matrix, constructed to show how often two messages were 
assigned to the same pile. The more emotionally similar the two compared 
messages are, the higher is their similarity score, indicated by a percentage. 
Thus, the minimum similarity is 0 and the maximum is 1. When the similarity 
score is 0, this implies that the messages were never assigned to the same pile. 
On the other hand, maximum similarity (1) implies that the messages were 
always put in the same pile. The information retrieved from this step is then 
further analyzed by a MDS algorithm, which then suggests how many 
dimensions best explain the similarity data. MDS consequently provides a 
geometric representation of the relationship between the messages by placing 
them in a spatial map. If two messages have more similar emotional content, 
this similarity is represented by their proximity in the map.    
The principal problem here is how to choose the “proper” dimensionality. 
Scaling with too few dimensions (m) may lead to distortion of the true structure 
or may even lead to technical problems. Choosing to work with too many 
dimensions might, on the other hand, damage the MDS structure (Borg & 
Groenen, 2005). For the purpose of determining the number of dimensions, it is 
often suggested to look at the stress value decrease (Kruskal, 1964), and some 
researchers in the field suggest to look for the “statistical elbow” (T. F. Cox & 
Cox, 2001) that could help identify the optimal number of dimensionalities.  
Stress is, in a way, similar to the correlation coefficient, except that it measures 
the badness-of-fit rather than the goodness-of-fit (Borg & Groenen, 2005). As 
mentioned, one theory suggests that one should pick that number of 
dimensions “for which further increase in m does not significantly reduce stress” 
(Kruskal, 1964 p. 16). To find that optimal m, one should first of all compute 
MDS solutions for different numbers of dimensionalities (e.g., for m = 1, 2, . . . , 
4) and then plot the resulting Stress values (on the Y -axis) against the m-
values (on the X-axis). This gives us a Scree Plot, which is generally 
represented by a curve that is monotonically decreasing, but at an increasingly 
slower rate (giving a slightly convex curve). What one looks for in this graphical 
representation, is the so called “statistical elbow”, a point in the curve where the 
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decrease in stress begins to be less pronounced (Borg & Groenen, 2005). The 
elbow point is thought to correspond to the dimensionality m that explains the 
data best.  
According to our Scree Plot (Figure 2),  the “elbow” occurs at 2 dimensions, 
since stress decrease becomes less significant for larger values of m.   
 
 
Figure 2: Scree Plot 
 
However, these purely mechanical criteria are not considered sufficient for 
evaluating Stress; a second important criterion is the interpretability of the 
coordinates (Kruskal, 1964). To be more precise, if the m-dimensional solution 
delivers a satisfying interpretation, but the (m+1)-dimensional one unveils no 
relevant structure, it makes no sense to use the additional dimension. In our 
case, upon investigating the possibility of a 3-dimensional solution, we have 
found that an additional dimension did not reveal any further structure and 
therefore there was no plausible explanation for the third dimension.  
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C.4) Interpretation of the Dimensions & Multidimensional Space 
 
After choosing the dimensionality, every dimension has to be interpreted and 
labeled. By using multidimensional scaling, each data item is represented as a 
data dot in a spatial map produced by the MDS analysis. The representation of 
qualitative data material in the multidimensional space makes it possible to 
notice patterns in the attributes of stimuli clustered around the ends of a 
dimensions continuum and other patterns that may stand out (Pinkley et al., 
2005). By comparing these clusters of data items at one endpoint of a 
dimensional axis to the data clusters at the other endpoint, it is possible to make 
inferences on their meaning. Because data items can be related to specific 
dimensions to a different extent, we are able to identify inter-dimensional 
relationships more easily. This characteristic of MDS is called data fuzziness 
and MDS allows us to capture  the multidimensional nature of “fuzzy” items 
(Varki, Cooil, Rust, & Smith, 2000).  Items with high loadings (be it positive or 
negative) on a specific dimension but with low loadings on the other, can be 
regarded as representative of that particular dimension (Pinkley et al., 2005). 
Items found close to the intersection of the axes are not considered strongly 
characteristic for any dimension, but should still be in compliance with their 
interpretations (Griessmair, Strunk, & Auer-Srnka, 2011).  
To get a more reliable definition and interpretation of our two main dimensions, 
we used the information provided by the raters in addition to the results of the 
qualitative analysis. Our raters were asked not only to sort the messages 
according to emotional similarity and rate them on a seven-point scale reflecting 
their emotional valence and strength, but they were also required to provide a 
short description of every emotional pile.  This valuable information helped in 
the process of interpreting the dimensions. Furthermore, we looked at the 
content of some of the messages situated at the endpoints of the axes and, in 
combination with the information from the raters, we were able to identify labels 
for our two dimensions (Table 3).  
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Dimensional Labels 
D1: pleasure vs. displeasure 
D2: idle vs. alert/surprised 
 
Table 3: Common Dimensional Labels 
 
In addition to the two main axes representing the two dimensions, we further 
investigated the messages situated in the inter-dimensional spaces (quadrants) 
and, after carefully inspecting their content and the results they yielded in the 
qualitative analysis, we labeled them as well. Consequently, we now have two 
additional inter-dimensions: angry/aroused vs. relaxed/calm, and cheerful vs. 
unhappy (Figure 3).   
 
 
Figure 3: Multidimensional Space 
 
As suggested by Seo, Barrett & Jin (2008), these affective states can be 
interpreted as combinations of the primary two emotional dimensions. We will 
go into the interpretation of the multidimensional space in more detail in the next 
few paragraphs. 
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C.4.1) The Circumplex Model of Affect in Online Negotiations 
 
One way of configuring and interpreting emotional dimensions is provided by 
the Valence/Arousal Circumplex Model of Affect. To the best of our knowledge, 
there has been only one study thus far that provides an interpretation of 
emotions in electronic commerce via the circumplex model. In this study, the 
authors propose a model “[…] able to capture and interpret the customer's 
emotional knowledge” (N. Jascanu, Jascanu, & Bumbaru, 2008 p.1) by 
incorporating emotions in a variety of aspects of e-commerce, from customer 
knowledge acquisition to bilateral negotiation and marketing research (N. 
Jascanu et al., 2008). In our study, we attempt to further develop this line of 
research by applying the circumplex framework into online negotiations with 
negotiation support. We suspect that the additional information provided by 
decision (negotiation) support will have influence on arousal in online 
negotiations because more precise information on issues important to 
negotiators could make them more alert in their actions and reactions. 
As shown by the dimensional analyses of similarity ratings in a number of 
studies, valence and arousal are the primary dimensions of the circumplex 
(Russell & Barrett, 1999). Valence indicates the pleasantness of the emotional 
experience, and arousal represents the activation linked to specific emotional 
experiences (Barrett & Fossum, 2001; Seo, Barrett, & Jin, 2008). The Model is 
represented by a spatial map in which affective concepts are placed into a circle 
in the following order: “pleasure (0°), excitement (45°), arousal (90°), distress 
(135°), displeasure (180°), depression (225°), sleepiness (270°), and relaxation 
(315°)” (Russell, 1980, p. 6). According to Russell (1980), affective states are 
best represented as a circular model in a “two-dimensional bipolar space” 
(p.1168), where the horizontal axis represents pleasure-displeasure and the 
vertical one indicates arousal-sleep. While the remaining four variables do not 
represent independent dimensions, they help define the quadrants of the 
multidimensional space. The notion suggests that affective states do not exist 
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independently of one another, but are correlated in a systematically, as we 
could observe in our case. Studies have shown that many emotional categories 
do not cluster around the valence or arousal axes, but they fall throughout the 
perimeter of the space defined by the two axes, thus suggesting that any affect 
term could be interpreted as a combination of the pleasure and arousal 
concepts (Russell, 1980; Russell & Pratt, 1980). Excitement, for instance, 
should not be interpreted as being only pleasant or arousing, but must be 
perceived as a combination of pleasure and arousal. Our spatial map, where we 
can observe the multitude of negotiation messages evenly distributed in space 
rather than clustered around the primary two axes, provides evidence for this 
notion. 
 
Figure 4: The Circumplex Model of Affect: Eight affective concepts in a circular order  
Adapted from: Russell (1980) 
 
It goes without saying that our multidimensional space represented in Figure 3 
shows a strong circumplex structure similar to the original circular ordering of 
the eight affective concepts as proposed by Russell (1980) (see Figure 4). This 
spatial cognitive map, with pleasure/displeasure and arousal dimensions as 
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anchors, is essentially always recovered in MDS analyses of similarity ratings of 
affective stimuli (Seo et al., 2008). The structure of the original model, proposed 
by Russell (1980) and represented in Figure 4, is derived from similarity ratings 
of affect words and valence and arousal represent the basic aspects of 
semantic knowledge about affect (Kring et al., 2003; Russell, 1980; Seo et al., 
2008).   We, however, incorporate the circumplex model in findings from online 
negotiations using similarity ratings of negotiation messages containing 
emotions. This is an interesting topic of discussion, since online negotiations 
are expected to provoke high levels of arousal (Griessmair & Koeszegi, 2009). 
On the other hand, one could argue that the mere existence of decision support 
tools and negotiator assistants might moderate these effects and act as a 
restraint to high levels of arousal. While we acknowledge the fact that our 
negotiators were in fact students, and thus their motivation and dedication to 
prevail in the negotiation game may be considered debatable, we argue that the 
great majority of researchers on similar topics also use students for research-
related experiments. As a result, we do not expect our results to be less valid or 
reliable, since it clearly does not deviate from the status quo of research. 
Moreover, the multidimensional representation of our findings clearly supports 
and strikes a strong resemblance to the Circumplex Model of Affect.    
 
 
C.4.2) Dimension n.1: pleasure vs. displeasure 
 
The dimension reflecting pleasure vs. displeasure is often referred to as valence 
in literature on dimensional representations of emotions, especially in literature 
on Circumplex Models of Affect. Studies on the semantics of emotional 
expressions, vocal and facial expressions of emotions recognize the importance 
of the valence dimension of affect and support its bipolarity (Kring et al., 2003; 
Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Russell & Bullock, 1986).  
Emotions situated at the displeasure extreme of the dimension are for instance 
frustration, depression or sadness (Russell, 1980), as documented by the 
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content of messages with low loadings on the first dimension (≤-0,5). The Mean 
Strength values, which are the average emotional ratings (on a 1-7 scale) that 
the raters assigned to the messages in question, support our findings thus far. 
 
Message 
ID 
Factor 
Loading 
Message Text Mean 
Strength 
 
 
 
 
 
14.0.a.09 
 
 
 
 
 
-0,79 
Good evening Mr. Husar, As said in my last reply, I have done all 
concessions I could make due to the limitations of my company. I 
hope you respect this. The only attribute I am allowed to give in 
on is the future revenue. Although my opinion is that my 
company deserves more than 50% I would not want to break 
down the negotiations on this. For giving in on the revenue I 
insist on Metallurg paying for the JV workers. Otherwise this 
project is financially not interesting for us. The majority in the 
board is a hard constraint which cannot be discussed as 
mentioned in my last reply.   I have done all I could do to meet 
the interests of your company. I am convinced we have a fair 
deal for both parties. Kind regards and a good weekend. Mr. 
Koller. 
 
 
 
 
 
4,23 
 
 
29.0.a.20 
 
 
-0,90 
As time is running, and of course I've shared my thoughts many 
times before I won't make any other suggestion. I count on an 
offer which we will accept on Sunday. Sunday is also the next 
time when I'm available online. Therefore I think that we only 
could exchange one last offer. 
 
 
5,09 
 
Table 4: Examples for displeasure 
 
The opposing extreme of this dimension represents pleasure and such 
emotions as happiness and delight (Russell, 1980). Consequently, messages 
found at and around this extreme tend to exhibit high loadings on the valence 
dimension (≥0,5).  The Mean Strength indicates that the messages were 
predominantly assigned to piles with rather positive emotional valence. 
 
Message 
ID 
Factor 
Loading 
Message Text Mean 
Strength 
 
 
05.1.b.02 
 
 
0,81 
Dear Mrs. Koller! I'm glad to negotiate with you with this system. I 
also hope that the ongoing negotiation will be respectful and I 
wish that both of us reach a good result for each party. What do 
you think when we explain each other our preferences and 
importance issues? We then might be able to reach the optimum 
for all. Best regards, Mr. Husar 
 
 
1,83 
  Dear Mrs. Koller, Thank you for your message. We at Metallurg  
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46.1.b.02 
 
 
 
0,82 
Technologies are happy that you contacted us regarding 
cooperation. I am excited about our negotiation and hope we will 
reach an agreement as soon as possible. We consider the Joint 
Venture to be an ideal cooperation to produce your new Blue 
Star engines. We have couple of important issues to negotiate 
about and we at Metallurg Technologies have had long 
discussion about all of them. We have also discussed in details 
with the government here in Lviv concerning the new plants and 
about the infrastructure here in the region. Hope to hear from you 
as soon as possible and we can start our negotiation. Best 
regards, Mrs. Husar 
 
 
 
2 
 
Table 5: Examples for pleasure 
 
From the descriptions of the piles provided by the raters, it is possible to extract 
affect terms for messages found at each dimensional pole. For example:  
    
Valence Descriptions 
Pleasure friendly, polite, professional, joyful, satisfied, happy, nice, considerate, 
cooperative 
Displeasure nervous, unfriendly, aggressive, angry, disappointed, distant, threatening, 
reluctant 
 
Table 6: Raters’ descriptions of the pleasure vs. displeasure dimension [D1] 
 
C.4.3) Dimension n.2: alert/surprised vs. idle 
 
The second dimension derived from the analysis indicates the level of idleness 
or surprise/alert in the negotiation messages. This particular dimension can be 
compared to the arousal (or activation) dimension typically found in models with 
a circular structure, like the one previously described.   In this case, arousal 
refers to “subjective feelings of activation associated with an affective 
experience” (Barrett & Fossum, 2001, p. 2). In the present study, messages 
transmitting low arousal were found at the dimension pole labeled “idle”, 
whereas, the messages transmitting high levels of arousal were found at the 
pole labeled “surprised/alert”. This is somewhat consistent with recent research 
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on emotions, which argues that different negative emotions transmit different 
levels of arousal (Morris & Keltner, 2000). However, we argue that both positive 
as well as negative emotions, when expressed in negotiation messages, can 
have this property.  
Accordingly, messages loading high on the second dimension express either 
emotions related to disappointment or unexpected, positive surprise (for 
examples see Table 7). Consistent with this logic, the emotional Mean Strength 
values for these messages can vary from emotionally positive to emotionally 
negative, depending on which side of the axis a specific message is situated in 
the circumplex. 
 
Message 
ID 
Factor 
Loading 
Message Text Mean 
Strength 
 
 
11.1.a.12 
 
 
0,94 
It took me about half an hour to find out how to accept/reject an 
offer. I'm so angry right now, that I just want to end this stupid 
negotiation - I figured the easiest way to do so is to accept your 
offer. Had a nice time negotiating. 
 
 
5,19 
 
44.1.a.16 
 
0,86 
Dear Husar! Thanks for the offer...I can finally accept the deal!  
It was nice doing business with you. Regards, Koller 
 
3,09 
 
Table 7: Examples for alert/surprised 
 
By contrast, messages with low loadings on this dimension in most cases 
consist of informal talk, proposals or questions (for examples see Table 8).  
Mean Strength values of these messages indicate that they were most 
frequently rated as being emotionally neutral.  
Message 
ID 
Factor 
Loading 
Message Text Mean 
Strength 
 
22.0.b.01 
 
-0,87 
Dear Mr./Mrs. Husar, I would like to start our business 
relationship by discussing the duration of contract. My first 
offer is a joint venture of 3 years. Best regards, Mr. Koller 
 
3,14 
 
21.0.a.09 
 
-0,84 
Dear Mr. Husar, I've completed the Vienna Mediator on the 
case of revenue sharing. Please let us continue the 
negotiation and let us know what you think of our latest offer. 
Best regards, Mr Koller 
 
3,45 
 
Table 8: Examples for idle 
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Raters described these and similar messages using the following terms:  
 
Arousal Descriptions 
Alert/surprised angry, astonished, offensive, disappointed, attacked / positive, friendly, direct
Idle  neutral, informal, emotionless, businesslike, calm, objective, cold, superficial 
 
Table 9: Raters’ descriptions of the alert/surprise vs. idle dimension [D2] 
 
 
 
C.4.4) Additional Variables That Define the Quadrants of the Circumplex 
 
As it has been thoroughly assessed in the previous paragraphs, emotion 
categories do not cluster at the dimensional axes, but they fall meaningfully into 
certain regions (quadrants) of the circumplex structure. The 45° bipolar axes 
account for such data items (in this case: messages) that can be related to the 
two dimensions to a different extent. For instance, messages with relatively high 
loadings both on the valence and on the arousal dimension cannot be perceived 
as having exclusively pleasant or arousing emotional content, but they 
represent a combination of these two.  Consequently, there are two additional 
axes reflecting the following states: cheerful vs. unhappy and relaxed/calm vs. 
angry/aroused (Figure 3). Similarly, these were labeled exciting vs. gloomy and 
relaxing vs. distressing in the Circumplex Model by Russell (1980). 
The following tables shed some light on the subject. Please observe that the 
Mean Strength indicates a positive emotional rating for the example for cheerful 
(1,57) and a negative rating for the example for unhappy (4,91). 
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Message 
ID 
Factor Loadings Message Text Mean 
Strength D1 D2 
 
 
 
 
 
40.1.b.10 
 
 
 
 
 
0,54 
 
 
 
 
 
      0,64 
Dear Mr. Koller, thank you for your reply and for our 
cooperation! I want to accept your last offer, but we both 
have to use Technical Assistant before. I wrote to 
support team and hope to get any information soon. 
Regarding costs and plants. It is very strange that we 
have different information, but I believe you and hope 
you believe me. I acted according my instruction and 
was sure that we will build 3 plants. Important is that our 
agreement is acceptable for both sides. I want to thank 
you for this work. I communicated with you with a big 
pleasure and will accept this offer as soon as I find this 
Assistant .Have a nice weekend also! =) 
 
 
 
 
 
1,57 
 
30.1.b.03 
 
-0,65 
 
-0,56 
This is not negotiable; the secrecy clause must be 
signed by Metallurg! 
 
4,91 
 
Table 10: Examples for cheerful and unhappy 
 
As one could expect, the Mean Strength value for the example for relaxed/calm 
(3,00) indicates significantly more emotionally positive rating than in the 
example for angry/aroused (6,43). 
 
Message 
ID 
Factor Loadings Message Text Mean 
Strength D1 D2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23.1.b.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0,61 
Dear H. Husar, First of all, my apologies for giving you 
the impression that we are taking advantage of Metallurg 
Technologies. This is not the case at all. We are very 
pleased to be having your company as a cooperation 
partner en therefore I really hope we can manage this 
negotiation. As for your last offer, I am sorry to say that 
Mihalits finds the secrecy clause an important factor for 
this cooperation and insists of this attribute being a 
positive outcome for our company. For the other six 
attributes our company doesn't meet one aspiration level 
at all. All the attributes are down to the hard constraints 
and we did not insist on any extra's, excluding the 
secrecy clause of course. Therefore I hope you can trust 
us for being a perfect and suitable partner for our 
company and you are willing to agree on our terms. The 
utility of the contract I am hoping you will agree on, is for 
Mihalits AG 51%, which shows the respect we have for 
your company! And a contract period of 8 years is within 
this business not short at all, the market changes rapidly 
and a lot can happen, for both parties. I believe 8 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3,00 
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is good length of period. Hope hearing from you. Yours 
faithfully, Katy Koller 
 
 
49.0.a.17 
 
 
-0,66 
 
 
0,67 
Now you're just trying to rob me! This secrecy clause is 
the one thing which is actually good for me, the rest I'm 
not happy with but I can live with. Hereby my new offer, 
I've downgraded the additional compensation of 
Ukrainian workers to 10 %. 
 
 
6,43 
 
Table 11: Examples for relaxed/calm and angry/aroused 
 
As visible in the next table, the descriptions of the messages found at the 
extremes of the previously described 45° rotated axes clearly represent 
combinations of descriptions of the valence and arousal dimensions as outlined 
in Tables 6 and 9.  
 
Label Descriptions 
Cheerful  Friendly, polite, considerate, happy, optimistic, joyful, excited 
Unhappy Unfriendly, assertive, nervous, negative, disappointed, worried, direct
Relaxed/calm Friendly, satisfied, positive, cooperative, formal, pleased, factual 
Angry/aroused Nervous, very emotional, stressed, angry, unfriendly, rude, furious 
 
Table 12: Raters’ descriptions of the 
 
Hence, this further supports our interpretation of the model and its conformity 
with the Circumplex Model of Affect.  
 
C.5) Emotional Dynamics 
All social phenomena unfold and change over time, and one of the best ways to 
understand them is to discover how they are born, develop and terminate […]. (Holmes 
& Poole, 1991) 
Research in the field of emotions mainly perceives emotions either as predictors 
of certain behavior and outcomes, or as consequences of certain behaviors and 
events (Barry, 2007). By acknowledging that emotions need to be considered 
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as triggers as well as consequences, we argue that it is necessary to take a 
dynamic point of view in order to understand the complex emotional processes 
that constantly evolve in negotiations. Emotions are dynamic, interpersonal 
forces that, by means of emotional interchange, have the tendency to result in 
spirals of emotional behavior (Brett et al., 1998).  Negotiations, on the other 
hand, are also processes that evolve over time, passing through different 
phases (Adair & Brett, 2005; Holmes, 1992; Mara Olekalns, 2002; Weingart & 
Olekalns, 2004). Phase analysis plays a big role in identifying the procedural 
dynamics in negotiations (S. Koeszegi, Pesendorfer, & Vetschera, 2008) and 
provides valuable insight into patterns of interaction (Brett et al., 1998).  
Phase models most commonly suggest that negotiations follow a specific 
sequence of phases, namely (1) an initiation phase, which involves relational 
positioning, showing of preferences and initial persuasion, (2) a problem solving 
phase, where negotiators exchange information and offers, try to build a 
relationship and generate solutions using factual discussion and persuasion, 
and (3) a resolution phase, where a detailed agreement is formulated and 
executed (Adair & Brett, 2005; Broekens & Jonker, 2010; Douglas, 1962; 
Holmes, 1992; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). Morris & Keltner (2000) argue that 
“[…] the phase structure of negotiations arises because negotiations involve a 
series of linked relational problems and these problems trigger distinct 
emotions” (p.23). It stands to reason that the identification of negotiation phases 
and of the accompanying emotional dynamics that orchestrate changes from 
one phase to the next is crucial for the understanding of emotional behavior that 
constantly evolves during the negotiation.  
For the purposes of our analysis, we divided each negotiation in three phases, 
which gave us the opportunity to investigate and compare the evolving 
emotional dynamics and the impact of DSS and NSS on negotiations with the 
same number of phases. If we compare the distribution of Pleasure vs. 
Displeasure (D1) and Alert vs. Calm (D2) by agreement for negotiations with 
and without DSS, we are able to arrive to some interesting findings. The first 
obvious finding, visible in Figures 5 and 6, is that both failed and successful 
negotiations evolve through different levels of pleasure/displeasure throughout 
the three phases. Negotiations that ended in agreement have a different pattern 
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of pleasure/displeasure throughout the phases than negotiations that ended in 
an impasse. However, there seems to be no difference in the effect of DSS on 
the emotional dynamics of successful and failed negotiations.  
In negotiations that ended in agreement, we observe high levels of pleasure in 
the first phase, followed by a fairly significant drop in pleasure in the second 
phase. The final phase brings back high pleasure levels which marks the end of 
a successful negotiation. This V-pattern indicating a decrease of pleasure to a 
neutral emotional level might be accounted for by the exchange of offers, 
rational persuasion and discussion that takes place in this (problem solving) 
phase. The later increase of pleasure implies that the previous problems have 
been resolved and a mutual ground has been found.  
Negotiations where no agreement was reached also have a distinct pattern that 
remains the same in both cases (without DSS and with DSS).  These 
negotiations are characterized by a constant decrease of pleasure throughout 
the phases. Failed negotiations therefore start off similarly to successful 
negotiations, with the only difference being that they remain stuck in the 
problem solving phase and the incapability to resolve issues leads the 
negotiators to experience even more displeasure in the last phase, which 
causes a negative emotional spiral that finally results in an impasse.  
 
 
Figure 5: Pleasure/Displeasure Distribution by Agreement for Negotiations without DSS 
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Figure 6: Pleasure/Displeasure Distribution by Agreement for Negotiations with DSS 
 
In the first two phases, there is no significant difference in the levels of 
pleasure/displeasure between successful and failed negotiations. However, in 
the last phase we can observe that successful negotiations are characterized by 
significantly more pleasure than failed negotiations, which contain high levels of 
displeasure. The distribution of loadings of the arousal dimension indicates that 
arousal changes over time, in both failed and successful negotiations. There is 
no visible outcome effect, i.e. successful negotiations do not differ on alert/calm 
from failed negotiations. In fact, they both seem to evolve in the same manner 
over time, with constant increases of the level of arousal from phase 1 to phase 
3. The only difference between negotiations with and without DSS seems to be 
that when DSS is present, the distribution of alert/calm is more dispersed than 
in cases without DSS. This could be explained by the effect of additional 
information provided by DSS on the negotiators' level of arousal.  
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Figure 7: Alert/Calm Distribution by Agreement for Negotiations without DSS 
 
 
Figure 8: Alert/Calm Distribution by Agreement for Negotiations with DSS 
 
The next two figures (Figure 9 and 10) are examples of the progression of a 
successful and a failed negotiation through time. The portrayal of the 
negotiators’ movements (i.e. the emotional strength of their messages) in the 
two-dimensional space is intended to give us a mental image of the dynamics of 
their interaction. Like before, the x-axis represents the pleasure/displeasure and 
the y-axis the alert/calm dimension. In Figure 9, we see a negotiation that starts 
off with a pleasant and relaxed tone, only to become slightly more alert when 
the first offer is sent. Then we observe a series of counteroffers that contain and 
result in high levels of alertness of both negotiators. When it finally comes to the 
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first use of VienNA (indicated by the green line), the arousal slightly decreases, 
but displeasure increases because the negotiators might realize their mistakes 
and their remaining options. However, they manage to resolve their problems 
and VienNA (blue line) in the last phase brings the negotiation to a successful 
end. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Two-dimensional Plot of a Successful Negotiation (Negotiation n° 12) 
 
The example of a failed negotiation portrayed in Figure 10 is visually different 
than the one in Figure 9. This is because this particular negotiation evolves 
differently and is characterized by emotions that score low on both the 
pleasure/displeasure and the alert/calm dimensions. Although it starts off in a 
relaxed and neutral tone, the subsequent messages contain high levels of 
displeasure, unhappiness and even anger. VienNA is successful in lowering 
arousal the first time it is used, however, later use of VienNA results in an 
escalation of anger and displeasure which leads to an impasse. 
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Figure 10: Two-dimensional Plot of a Failed Negotiation (Negotiation n° 9) 
 
 
 
C.6) Results 
 
In chapter C.6.1 we will shortly describe the method used to obtain the results 
which we used to draw conclusions about the research questions. They will be 
presented subsequently in the next few chapters.  
 
C.6.1) Method 
 
Our goal was to compare the difference in means between negotiations 
with/without DSS, those who ended in agreement/disagreement and those who 
are characterized by the use of VienNA in different phases of the negotiation. 
Therefore, we performed independent sample t-tests (mean value comparisons) 
in the search for results for our research questions. Independent sample t-tests 
convey the significance of differences in means between specific groups. 
Significance implies that we reject the null hypothesis which implies that the 
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group means are equal and therefore conclude that they are significantly 
different. We are using the significance level of 0.10 as the upper threshold for 
significant results (p<0.10), while results that point to p<0.01 will be considered 
highly significant. Because of the multiple comparisons that were performed, we 
used alpha adjustments to control for falsely rejected hypotheses. The alpha 
adjustment being used is the False Discovery Rate (FDR), developed by 
Benjamini & Hochberg (1995) who argued that this specific alpha adjustment is 
more advantageous than others (e.g. the Bonferroni adjustment) because of its 
increased power.  
We looked at the differences in loadings on both the pleasure/displeasure and 
the alert/calm dimension and the similarity of emotions between negotiators. 
Besides that, we investigated the differences in contract imbalance between 
negotiators throughout the negotiation. Contract imbalance is the difference 
between a sender's best and a receiver's worst utility on a transmitted offer.  To 
do all this, we made use of dyadic indexes  designed to assess 
similarity/dissimilarity across a set of items for each dyad (Kenny, Kashy, & 
Cook, 2006). Specifically, we tested the correlation, discrepancy and intraclass 
correlation dyadic indexes.  
Whereas all three indexes provide a measure of similarity/dissimilarity, the 
discrepancy measure proved to be best suited for our interpretation of the 
results, as it provides the most consistent results and is in accordance with 
recommendations by Kenny et al. (2006). The discrepancy measure is the sum 
of absolute differences divided by the number of dyadic exchanges per 
negotiation phase. Therefore, we include this dyadic index in the following 
sections because of its value to the interpretation and discussion of the final 
results. Similarity measures provide “[…] a unique estimate of the relationship 
between scores from indistinguishable dyad members” (Kenny et al., 2006, p. 
33). This is particularly important in our case because we are not able to 
differentiate between dyad members based on their gender, nationality or other 
meaningful characteristics. The negotiators could be distinguished in terms of 
their company affiliation (Mihalits or Metallurg), but we argue that this did not 
influence their behavior in any way. A dissimilarity measure like the discrepancy 
index assumes perfect similarity from the start, and measures how dissimilar 
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the items are later on. Any score that is nonzero indicates some dissimilarity 
and larger scores are signs of larger dissimilarity.  Statistical results on all these 
items and measures gave us valuable insight in the effects of the use of DSS 
and VienNa on the negotiation. Furthermore, it has presented us with the 
opportunity to make a contribution to current research on the complex dynamics 
of emotions in online negotiations. We will subsequently describe the main 
results of our analysis by investigating the emotional dynamics on the level of 
the whole negotiation and on the level of the single phases. 
 
C.6.2) Results for DSS vs. No DSS 
 
The first group of results is intended to give us insight into the differences 
between negotiations with decision support and those without decision support. 
Moreover, we look at these differences separately, only in negotiations that 
ended in agreement and only in negotiations that ended in disagreement.  The 
overall results on the level of the whole negotiation, for those that ended in 
agreement, indicate that there is no difference in emotions between 
negotiations with and without DSS, as indicated by the adjusted significance 
values in Table 13.  We also found no differences in emotional (dis)similarity or 
contract imbalance on this level of investigation.  
                                       
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
o_CI -1,931 36 ,061 1 21 ,4853 0.3069465 
0 17 ,5585 
o_D1 ,296 36 ,769 1 21 ,079687 0.7692695 
0 17 ,063260 
o_D1_Disc ,691 36 ,494 1 21 ,231523 0.7692695 
0 17 ,217030 
o_D2 -,845 36 ,404 1 21 -,020284 0.7692695 
0 17 ,030715 
o_D2_Disc -,371 36 ,713 1 21 ,218780 0.7692695 
0 17 ,225574 
 
Table 13: Overall Results for DSS vs. No DSS/Agreement 
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The results pertaining to unsuccessful negotiations also do not indicate any 
significant differences in emotions, emotional similarity or contract imbalance 
between negotiations with and without DSS. 
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
o_CI -,607 17 ,552 1 11 ,5264 0.6823138 0 8 ,5647 
o_D1 -,519 17 ,610 1 11 -,143144 0.6823138 0 8 -,100720 
o_D1_Disc ,681 17 ,505 1 11 ,225983 0.6823138 0 8 ,203176 
o_D2 ,416 17 ,682 1 11 ,010411 0.6823138 0 8 -,025293 
o_D2_Disc ,707 17 ,489 1 11 ,271839 0.6823138 0 8 ,244830 
 
Table 14: Overall Results for DSS vs. No DSS/No Agreement 
 
As for the first phase of the negotiation, we again observed no indication of DSS 
influence on differences in contract imbalance and emotional dimensions, 
whether it ended in agreement (Table 15) or not (Table16).  
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
ph1_CI 1,179 36 ,246 1 21 ,7355 0.4100825 
0 17 ,6174 
ph1_D1 -,794 36 ,432 1 21 ,277322 0.5402104 
0 17 ,349767 
ph1_D1_Disc -,270 36 ,789 1 21 ,194534 0.8013663 
0 17 ,203331 
ph1_D2 -1,226 36 ,228 1 21 -,081303 0.4100825 
0 17 -,005643 
ph1_D2_Disc 2,307 36 ,027 1 21 ,261479 0.1344805 
0 17 ,168269 
 
Table 15: Phase 1 Results for DSS vs. No DSS/Agreement 
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  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
ph1_CI 1,096 17 ,288 1 11 ,7028 0.8782543 
0 8 ,5080 
ph1_D1 -,171 17 ,866 1 11 ,229159 0.8782543 
0 8 ,254485 
ph1_D1_Disc -,156 17 ,878 1 11 ,241211 0.8782543 
0 8 ,256117 
ph1_D2 ,423 17 ,678 1 11 -,091362 0.8782543 
0 8 -,145268 
ph1_D2_Disc ,216 17 ,832 1 11 ,196825 0.8782543 
0 8 ,183575 
 
Table 16: Phase 1 Results for DSS vs. No DSS/No Agreement 
 
Moving on to the second phase, there is indication of significant differences in 
contract imbalance between negotiations with and without DSS in the case of 
successful negotiations (Table 17). Specifically, these results imply that contract 
imbalance is bigger in negotiations without DSS than in negotiations with DSS. 
Otherwise, no significant results pertaining to emotions and emotional similarity 
were found in this phase.  
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
ph2_CI -2,545 36 ,015 1 21 ,4630 0.0767325 
0 17 ,5997 
ph2_D1 ,954 36 ,347 1 21 -,043256 0.8663015 
0 17 -,108513 
ph2_D1_Disc ,067 36 ,947 1 21 ,220851 0.9469504 
0 17 ,218937 
ph2_D2 -,394 36 ,696 1 21 -,046551 0.8696800 
0 17 -,018187 
ph2_D2_Disc -,591 36 ,558 1 21 ,208798 0.8696800 
0 17 ,223184 
 
Table 17: Phase 2 Results for DSS vs. No DSS/Agreement 
 
For failed negotiations, no significant differences between DSS and No DSS 
groups in the second phase were found (Table 18).  
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  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
ph2_CI -1,095 17 ,289 1 11 ,5389 0.4815587 
0 8 ,6074 
ph2_D1 -,553 17 ,588 1 11 -,194455 0.5875060 
0 8 -,150486 
ph2_D1_Disc 1,418 17 ,174 1 11 ,232299 0.4815587 
0 8 ,183212 
ph2_D2 -1,279 17 ,218 1 11 -,085912 0.4815587 
0 8 ,066893 
ph2_D2_Disc ,890 17 ,386 1 11 ,277726 0.4823065 
0 8 ,235454 
 
Table 18: Phase 2 Results for DSS vs. No DSS/No Agreement 
 
Nevertheless, the results show a significant difference in contract imbalance in 
the final phase of successful negotiations (Table 19), again indicating that there 
is more contract imbalance in negotiations without DSS. Also, there is indication 
of differences in emotional dissimilarity on the pleasure/displeasure dimension 
between the two groups of negotiations. According to this specific result, there 
is more similarity of pleasure/displeasure in negotiations without DSS.  
However, no differences of mean loadings on any of the two emotional 
dimensions were found.      
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
ph3_CI -3,618 36 ,001 1 21 ,257286 0.0027220 
0 17 ,458549 
ph3_D1 -,303 36 ,764 1 21 ,090158 0.7637621 
0 17 ,118115 
ph3_D1_Disc 2,180 36 ,036 1 21 ,303015 0.0896905 
0 17 ,215130 
ph3_D2 -,558 36 ,580 1 21 ,077909 0.7255422 
0 17 ,138130 
ph3_D2_Disc -1,130 36 ,266 1 21 ,210411 0.4434458 
0 17 ,264010 
 
Table 19: Phase 3 Results for DSS vs. No DSS/Agreement 
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On the other hand, no significant results were found in the final phase of failed 
negotiations, indicating that negotiations with and without DSS are emotionally 
similar in phase 3 when no agreement is reached.  
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
DSS N Mean 
ph3_CI -2,396 16 ,029 1 11 ,337455 0.1457040 
0 7 ,549163 
ph3_D1 -,225 16 ,825 1 11 -,376360 0.8251154 
0 7 -,351612 
ph3_D1_Disc -1,086 15 ,294 1 10 ,178936 0.4907333 
0 7 ,250662 
ph3_D2 1,431 16 ,172 1 11 ,195125 0.4288995 
0 7 -,015488 
ph3_D2_Disc -,261 15 ,798 1 10 ,278489 0.8251154 
0 7 ,301771 
 
Table 20: Phase 3 Results for DSS vs. No DSS/No Agreement 
 
In sum, negotiations started off in a similar manner irrespective of whether they 
ended in agreement or not. In fact, with respect to the first research question, it 
seems that DSS does not have any effect on the emotional behavior of 
negotiators in the first two phases of the negotiation. However, when 
negotiations reach the final phase, the DSS effect of lowering the contract 
imbalance between negotiators is significant in the case of successful 
negotiations. Also, participants in successful negotiations without DSS are 
significantly more emotionally similar on the pleasure/displeasure dimension in 
the end than participants in negotiations with DSS. 
 
 
C.6.3) Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement 
 
Within this section, we are going to present the results obtained by investigating 
the difference in means between negotiations that ended in agreement and 
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those that did not. We did not only look at the big picture, but we also 
investigated these differences limiting the analysis only to negotiations with 
DSS and only to negotiations without DSS, because we are interested in the 
role DSS plays in successful and unsuccessful negotiations.  
The findings on the level of the whole negotiation (with DSS) point to a highly 
significant difference in mean pleasure/displeasure (D1) between negotiations 
that ended in agreement and those that ended in an impasse, indicating that 
negotiations that ended in agreement are characterized by significantly higher 
levels of pleasure than negotiations that failed. No significant results pertaining 
to contract imbalance were found on the level of the whole negotiation. 
However, the adjusted significance level suggests that there is a difference in 
dissimilarity of alert/calm (D2) between successful and failed negotiations. The 
results show that there is more similarity on the second dimension in 
negotiations that ended in agreement.   
 
                                       
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Agr N Mean 
o_CI -1,040 30 ,307 1 21 ,4853 0.5109542 
0 11 ,5264 
o_D1 3,585 30 ,001 1 21 ,079687 0.0058875 
0 11 -,143144 
o_D1_Disc ,235 30 ,816 1 21 ,231523 0.8157211 
0 11 ,225983 
o_D2 -,408 30 ,686 1 21 -,020284 0.8157211 
0 11 ,010411 
o_D2_Disc -2,433 30 ,021 1 21 ,218780 0.0528325 
0 11 ,271839 
 
Table 21: Overall Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/DSS 
 
However, when we limited our investigation only to negotiations without DSS, 
we obtained no significant results, indicating that successful and failed 
negotiations are similar when there is no DSS.  
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  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Agr N Mean 
o_CI -,101 23 ,921 1 17 ,5585 0.9206182 
0 8 ,5647 
o_D1 2,141 23 ,043 1 17 ,063260 0.2155060 
0 8 -,100720 
o_D1_Disc ,454 23 ,654 1 17 ,217030 0.8180303 
0 8 ,203176 
o_D2 ,819 23 ,421 1 17 ,030715 0.8180303 
0 8 -,025293 
o_D2_Disc -,609 23 ,549 1 17 ,225574 0.8180303 
0 8 ,244830 
 
Table 22: Overall Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/No DSS 
 
In the initial phase of the negotiation, no significant differences between 
successful and failed negotiations were found on any level in both groups of 
negotiations (DSS and No DSS), as attested by Tables 23 and 24.This shows 
that negotiations in each separate group tend to start off similarly, irrespective 
of whether they end up in agreement or not.   
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 Agr N Mean 
ph1_CI ,284 30 ,779 1 21 ,7355 0.9246399 
0 11 ,7028 
ph1_D1 ,429 30 ,671 1 21 ,277322 0.9246399 
0 11 ,229159 
ph1_D1_Disc -1,135 30 ,265 1 21 ,194534 0.9246399 
0 11 ,241211 
ph1_D2 ,120 30 ,906 1 21 -,081303 0.9246399 
0 11 -,091362 
ph1_D2_Disc 1,222 30 ,231 1 21 ,261479 0.9246399 
0 11 ,196825 
 
Table 23: Phase 1 Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/DSS 
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  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 Agr N Mean 
ph1_CI ,707 23 ,487 1 17 ,6174 0.7312301 
0 8 ,5080 
ph1_D1 ,794 23 ,435 1 17 ,349767 0.7312301 
0 8 ,254485 
ph1_D1_Disc -,697 23 ,493 1 17 ,203331 0.7312301 
0 8 ,256117 
ph1_D2 1,538 23 ,138 1 17 -,005643 0.6884295 
0 8 -,145268 
ph1_D2_Disc -,348 23 ,731 1 17 ,168269 0.7312301 
0 8 ,183575 
 
Table 24: Phase 1 Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/No DSS 
 
T-tests performed for phase 2 of the negotiation did not provide any significant 
results neither for negotiations with DSS nor for those without DSS (see Tables 
25 and 26), again indicating that negotiations tend to evolve in a similar manner 
regardless of DSS. 
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Agr N Mean 
ph2_CI -1,258 30 ,218 1 21 ,4630 0.3635655 
0 11 ,5389 
ph2_D1 2,080 30 ,046 1 21 -,043256 0.1193155 
0 11 -,194455 
ph2_D1_Disc -,421 30 ,677 1 21 ,220851 0.6771072 
0 11 ,232299 
ph2_D2 ,454 30 ,653 1 21 -,046551 0.6771072 
0 11 -,085912 
ph2_D2_Disc -2,064 30 ,048 1 21 ,208798 0.1193155 
0 11 ,277726 
 
Table 25: Phase 2 Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/DSS 
  
  t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Agr N Mean 
ph2_CI -,122 23 ,904 1 17 ,5997 0.9035958 
0 8 ,6074 
ph2_D1 ,485 23 ,632 1 17 -,108513 0.8919681 
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0 8 -,150486 
ph2_D1_Disc ,873 23 ,392 1 17 ,218937 0.8919681 
0 8 ,183212 
ph2_D2 -,854 23 ,402 1 17 -,018187 0.8919681 
0 8 ,066893 
ph2_D2_Disc -,372 23 ,714 1 17 ,223184 0.8919681 
0 8 ,235454 
 
Table 26: Phase 2 Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/No DSS 
 
Moving on to the final phase, we have found several significant results. First of 
all, in negotiations with DSS there is significantly more pleasure (less 
displeasure) in negotiations that ended in agreement. Also, the results show 
that there is more similarity in pleasure/displeasure in failed negotiations with 
presence of DSS than in successful negotiations. 
  
 
 
  
t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics
Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Agr N Mean 
ph3_CI -1,012 30 ,320 1 21 ,257286 0.3631845 
0 11 ,337455 
ph3_D1 5,460 30 ,000 1 21 ,090158 0.0000320 
0 11 -,376360 
ph3_D1_Disc 2,747 29 ,010 1 21 ,303015 0.0255980 
0 10 ,178936 
ph3_D2 -,923 30 ,363 1 21 ,077909 0.3631845 
0 11 ,195125 
ph3_D2_Disc -1,275 29 ,213 1 21 ,210411 0.3541675 
0 10 ,278489 
 
Table 27: Phase 3 Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/DSS 
 
In phase 3 of negotiations without DSS, the results also show that there is 
significantly more pleasure in successful negotiations than in failed negotiations, 
which indicates that in the end, successful negotiations without DSS will be 
defined by high pleasure messages. Otherwise we have not found any 
significant results pertaining to emotional similarity or contract imbalance in this 
particular negotiation subgroup.  
82 
 
  
 
 
  
t-test for Equality of Means Group Statistics
Adjusted 
Sig. T Df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Agr N Mean 
ph3_CI -2,013 22 ,057 1 17 ,458549 0.1412835 
0 7 ,549163 
ph3_D1 3,360 22 ,003 1 17 ,118115 0.0141455 
0 7 -,351612 
ph3_D1_Disc -,574 22 ,572 1 17 ,215130 0.6401277 
0 7 ,250662 
ph3_D2 1,154 22 ,261 1 17 ,138130 0.4349978 
0 7 -,015488 
ph3_D2_Disc -,474 22 ,640 1 17 ,264010 0.6401277 
0 7 ,301771 
 
Table 28: Phase 3 Results for Agreement vs. No Agreement/No DSS 
 
Therefore, with reference to the second research question, we found no 
differences between successful and failed negotiations in phases 1 and 2, 
because both tend to start and evolve in a similar manner as the parties 
introduce and try to position themselves in the negotiation. However, as they 
reach the last phase, results indicate that negotiators show more pleasure in 
successful negotiations both with and without DSS. 
 
C.6.4) Results According to VienNA Use 
 
The results presented in this section are aimed to provide answers to the third 
research question, pertaining to the use of the Negotiator Assistant within 
specific negotiation phases. We found that, because of the limitations caused 
by relatively small sample size that is in some cases reduced to just one or two 
negotiations, the use of t-tests would be highly inappropriate and 
counterproductive. That is why we used only qualitative analysis via descriptive 
statistics in this part of our research.  
Specifically, we investigated the effects of using the VienNA assistant in a 
specific phase by looking at the mean values of contract imbalance, 
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pleasure/displeasure, alert/calm and their discrepancy indexes in each phase of 
the negotiation.  As the results pertaining to failed negotiations sometimes have 
a sample size reduced to one negotiation, we will only describe the results for 
successful negotiations with and without DSS.  
 
C.6.4.1) VienNA Use in Phase 1 
 
In Table 29, we can observe descriptive statistics for negotiations in which 
VienNA was used in the first phase. If we compare the means according to 
whether DSS was present in the negotiation or not, we see that the contract 
imbalance in the first phase is bigger in negotiations without DSS. This is also 
consistent with the results found in chapter C.6.2.  When there is no DSS, the 
maximum contract imbalance in phase 1 can reach 1.00, but when DSS is 
present the highest possible contract imbalance is just 0.55. As visible in Figure 
11, there is no big difference in mean pleasure/displeasure between 
negotiations with and without DSS in phase 1. However in phase 2, pleasure is 
highly reduced in negotiations with DSS when compared to negotiations without 
DSS, where pleasure is lower than in the previous phase, but still positive. In 
phase 3, we observe an increase in pleasure in both groups of negotiations, 
however those without DSS are characterized by more pleasure in the end.  
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Figure 11: Mean Values of Pleasure/Displeasure/VienNA Use in Phase 1 
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Also, it is indicated by the results (Table 29) that in phase 3 there is more 
similarity in pleasure/displeasure between negotiators in negotiations without 
DSS. When VienNA is used in the first phase of a negotiation with DSS, results 
imply that the negotiators are more calm/idle than in negotiations without DSS 
in all three phases. The negotiators' arousal seems to increase radically in the 
final phase of the negotiation in both negotiations with and without DSS.   
 
 DSS No DSS 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
ph1_CI 2 ,08 ,55 ,3125 3 ,42 1,00 ,7178 
ph1_D1 2 ,2415 ,7182 ,479850 3 ,2038 ,6499 ,420367 
ph1_D1_Disc 2 ,1025 ,1847 ,143600 3 ,0254 ,3847 ,201033 
ph1_D2 2 -,1511 ,1635 ,006200 3 -,1098 ,3268 ,122500 
ph1_D2_Disc 2 ,1441 ,2081 ,176100 3 ,0903 ,2920 ,198833 
ph2_CI 2 ,53 ,55 ,5392 3 ,30 ,54 ,4422 
ph2_D1 2 -,3066 -,2010 -,253800 3 -,1250 ,2115 ,026667 
ph2_D1_Disc 2 ,2840 ,3361 ,310050 3 ,1994 ,5258 ,334633 
ph2_D2 2 -,2194 ,2368 ,008700 3 -,1161 ,2598 ,022733 
ph2_D2_Disc 2 ,1743 ,3545 ,264400 3 ,1219 ,3035 ,242033 
ph3_CI 2 ,3900 ,4700 ,430000 3 ,4200 ,4800 ,445833 
ph3_D1 2 -,3786 ,2706 -,054000 3 -,0167 ,5558 ,235233 
ph3_D1_Disc 2 ,2101 ,3725 ,291300 3 ,1344 ,1475 ,140767 
ph3_D2 2 -,0396 ,5435 ,251950 3 ,1118 ,6396 ,315533 
ph3_D2_Disc 2 ,1301 ,1347 ,132400 3 ,1098 ,2858 ,168600 
 
Table 29: Descriptive Statistics for VienNA Use in Phase 1 
 
 
C.6.4.2) VienNA Use in Phase 2 
 
When we narrowed the field of investigation only to negotiations in which the 
Negotiator Assistant was used in the second phase, the results we obtained 
suggested that there is more pleasure in phase 1 in negotiations without DSS 
85 
 
than in those with DSS. However, in the second phase, even though negotiators 
in both negotiations with and without DSS experience a decrease of pleasure, 
the decrease is smaller in negotiations with DSS. An increase in pleasure is 
characteristic for the last phase of successful negotiations, which in this case is 
significantly larger in negotiations with DSS, as indicated in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Mean Values of Pleasure/Displeasure/VienNA Use in Phase 2 
 
Throughout all the phases, arousal is slightly higher in negotiations without 
DSS, which in the last phase reaches its high point indicating that in these 
negotiations, the negotiators are especially more alert/less calm in the end 
compared to negotiations with DSS. Also, when VienNA is used in phase 2, 
contract imbalance decreases throughout the phases but in the last phase it is 
significantly higher in negotiations without DSS.  
 
 DSS No DSS 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
ph1_CI 11 ,08 1,00 ,7702 9 ,00 1,00 ,6620
ph1_D1 11 -,2049 ,7182 ,291582 9 ,0658 ,7334 ,418433
ph1_D1_Disc 11 ,1025 ,3256 ,193982 9 ,0234 ,4371 ,199700
ph1_D2 11 -,3831 ,1699 -,140009 9 -,1752 ,4117 ,077867
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ph1_D2_Disc 11 ,0835 ,5271 ,251036 9 ,0063 ,3686 ,168167 
ph2_CI 11 ,26 ,73 ,4576 9 ,30 ,71 ,5669 
ph2_D1 11 -,3469 ,3669 -,027045 9 -,4001 ,2188 -,039756 
ph2_D1_Disc 11 ,1005 ,2840 ,188609 9 ,1327 ,5258 ,245756 
ph2_D2 11 -,4095 ,2375 -,059245 9 -,2741 ,2598 -,010156 
ph2_D2_Disc 11 ,0668 ,3176 ,198745 9 ,1219 ,3266 ,223744 
ph3_CI 11 ,0367 ,6400 ,262348 9 ,4033 ,5200 ,454352 
ph3_D1 11 -,1542 ,4210 ,185982 9 -,6257 ,5558 -,014033 
ph3_D1_Disc 11 ,1478 ,3725 ,262964 9 ,0519 ,5928 ,176000 
ph3_D2 11 -,5683 ,5738 ,036300 9 -,3465 ,6628 ,207689 
ph3_D2_Disc 11 ,0621 ,4298 ,189818 9 ,0603 ,5824 ,257456 
 
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics for VienNA Use in Phase 2 
 
 
C.6.4.3) VienNA Use in Phase 3 
 
In negotiations where VienNA was used in the last phase, there is indication 
that mean pleasure in that phase is significantly higher in negotiations without 
DSS even though it was consistently lower in the previous phases (see Figure 
13).  
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Figure 13: Mean Values of Pleasure/Displeasure/VienNA Use in Phase 3 
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According to the results, contract imbalance in phase 1 is higher in negotiations 
with DSS and subsequently tends to decrease. However, in negotiations without 
DSS, it slightly rises in the second phase and in phase 3 finally settles at a 
value significantly higher than in negotiations with DSS. The same effect can be 
observed in the case when VienNA is used in phase 2 and it is consistent with 
results presented in chapter C.6.2 which show that the final contract imbalance 
is significantly higher in negotiations without DSS.  
 
 DSS No DSS 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
ph1_CI 13 ,23 ,95 ,7428 11 ,00 1,00 ,5857
ph1_D1 13 -,3794 ,6325 ,310831 11 -,2138 ,8052 ,285936
ph1_D1_Disc 13 ,1028 ,3236 ,192238 11 ,0186 ,4371 ,235845
ph1_D2 13 -,2103 ,1635 -,033931 11 -,4046 ,1821 -,075091
ph1_D2_Disc 13 ,0835 ,5139 ,241546 11 ,0464 ,2832 ,169327
ph2_CI 13 ,10 ,74 ,4540 11 ,25 ,83 ,6140
ph2_D1 13 -,3689 ,1989 -,043069 11 -,4038 ,2188 -,113882
ph2_D1_Disc 13 ,1005 ,3556 ,234338 11 ,1046 ,2680 ,184918
ph2_D2 13 -,4241 ,3955 -,011485 11 -,4179 ,3497 -,023300
ph2_D2_Disc 13 ,0888 ,3571 ,226069 11 ,1220 ,3035 ,214682
ph3_CI 13 ,0000 ,5250 ,242026 11 ,0960 ,5500 ,459879
ph3_D1 13 -,3786 ,3352 ,031277 11 -,1120 ,5230 ,203355
ph3_D1_Disc 13 ,1478 ,6168 ,314477 11 ,0554 ,5928 ,262573
ph3_D2 13 -,3761 ,7063 ,133669 11 -,3723 ,5339 ,050045
ph3_D2_Disc 13 ,0659 ,3769 ,239308 11 ,0745 ,5779 ,283200
 
Table 31: Descriptive Statistics for Vienna Use in Phase 3 
 
C.7) Summary and Discussion of Results 
 
The analysis of our negotiations produced interesting results with respect to 
whether decision support (DSS) was provided or not. Using whole negotiations 
as units of analysis, no significant results were obtained in terms of differences 
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between negotiations with and without DSS in contract imbalance, emotional 
loadings of messages and emotional similarity between negotiators on both 
dimensions. However the use of single phases as units of analysis generated   
several significant insights on the effects of decision support on emotions and 
contract imbalance in online negotiations. 
 The results imply that DSS leads to lower contract imbalance between 
negotiators in the last two phases of negotiations that ended in agreement. It 
can be argued that the DSS functions that help the negotiators understand their 
preferences generate more rational offers and counteroffers, which reflects 
upon the contract imbalance. The absence of significant results  on the 
difference in emotional loadings of messages, emotional similarity and contract 
imbalance in the first phase  of  negotiations with and without DSS indicates 
that in the beginning of a negotiation, having DSS or not does not make a 
difference as far as emotional behavior, emotional similarity or contract 
imbalance are concerned. The last phase of successful negotiations is 
characterized by more emotional similarity in pleasure/displeasure when DSS is 
not provided than when it is. This DSS effect might be accounted for by the 
negotiators' different coping mechanisms when confronted with a complex 
support system. Some negotiators might feel overstrained as a result of too 
much information imposed by the system and thus react with displeasure, while 
their counterparts may feel more comfort and pleasure using the system. On the 
other hand, no differences between DSS and no DSS groups were found 
among failed negotiations. To conclude, successful negotiations with and 
without DSS do not appear to differ on emotions, but on similarity of emotional 
behavior of the participating negotiators. We consider this to be an indication of 
the effects of reciprocity and emotional contagion in an online negotiation 
setting. In successful negotiations without DSS, negotiators have very limited 
information, so they are more susceptible to the information and emotional 
expressions of their counterpart.  This is when contagion sets in by “infecting” 
the negotiators with their counterpart’s emotions and thus causing them to be 
more emotionally similar.  Since contagion is more likely to occur in cooperative 
settings (Van Kleef et al., 2010), it might explain why no emotional similarity 
was found in failed negotiations  
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The results of our Agreement vs. No Agreement comparison on the level of the 
whole negotiation show that successful negotiations with DSS are characterized 
by significantly more pleasure than failed negotiations. Furthermore, negotiators 
tend to be more similar in their alert/calm emotional behavior in successful as 
compared to failed negotiations when DSS is provided. Since we postulate that 
DSS provides additional information that may cause negotiators to be more 
alert, it could be argued that this additional contagion effect results in 
agreement if negotiators use DSS correctly and are excited to use it, and thus 
transfer these feelings to their counterpart. On the other hand, it may results in 
disagreement if they do not use it correctly and are distressed by it.  
The last phase of failed negotiations is characterized by more displeasure than 
the last phase of successful negotiations, both with and without DSS. Failed 
negotiations are therefore significantly less pleasant, especially in the end, 
when negotiators reach the final phase without experiencing enough progress. 
This implies that, if negotiations already have a bad track record by phase 3, 
then DSS is not likely to help. Negotiators in failed negotiations with DSS are 
more emotionally similar in pleasure/displeasure in the last phase than 
negotiators in successful negotiations with DSS. This suggests that participants 
in failed negotiations with DSS reinforce each other’s feelings of displeasure 
once they arrive to the last phase without experiencing meaningful progress. On 
the other hand, negotiators in successful negotiations with DSS each have 
different interpretations of what they have gained so far and consequently 
express different emotions. This is why the negotiators are less emotionally 
similar in pleasure/displeasure in successful negotiations than in failed 
negotiations with DSS. 
Overall, results show that successful and failed negotiations tend to evolve 
similarly on both dimensions in the first two phases, during which the 
negotiators introduce and try to position themselves  (see Phase Model Theory: 
Douglas, 1962; Holmes, 1992). However, there is indication that significant 
differences in emotional behavior surface in the last phase of the negotiation.    
As previously mentioned, VienNa is a Negotiator Assistant which acts as a 
neutral expert and helps with several aspects of the conflict situation. In addition 
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to the inspection of the effects of a DSS, we investigated the influences of 
VienNA use in different phases of the online negotiation on the emotional 
dynamics. A general result pertaining to VienNA use in specific negotiation 
phases indicates that it is more beneficial (i.e. it results in more positive 
emotions - pleasure) if VienNA is used at an earlier stage than later, especially 
in the case when DSS is not at the disposal of the negotiating parties. Figure 14 
shows the mean loadings of pleasure/displeasure when VienNA is used in 
different phases of negotiations without DSS. In these negotiations VienNA 
constitutes the only source of unbiased information available to both negotiators 
and therefore is extremely valuable to them. Moreover, the results also indicate 
that when VienNA is used in phase 1 in negotiations without DSS, there is more 
similarity in pleasure in the last phase than in negotiations with DSS. The same 
is true when VienNA is used in phase 2, which could imply that the emotional 
climate in the last phase of negotiations without DSS is influenced by the use of 
VienNA in either of the first two phases.  If it is used in either of the first two 
phases, it is plausible to assume that VienNA has enough time to mediate and 
influence the negotiators’ judgments, perceptions and emotions before reaching 
the last phase. When it is used in the beginning of a negotiation, VienNA 
provides a great deal of information to the negotiators, so they do not have to 
spend a lot of time on further information gathering, but can dedicate it to 
dealing with the negotiation itself.   
 
Figure 14: Pleasure/Displeasure Evolution According to VienNA Use/No DSS 
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In negotiations with DSS however, as visible in Figure 15, it is not 
recommended to use VienNA at the very beginning. This indicates that 
additional information is beneficial, but not in all situations and in the same 
amount, especially when there is already an important source of information 
that occupies the negotiators’ information-processing capacity.  Schoop, Jertila, 
& List (2003) refer to this particular problem as “over-structuring”, as the system 
begins to control the negotiators, instead the other way around, which in turn 
affects their emotional behavior by causing distress and displeasure. The 
system should allow for flexibility and be user-friendly as not to impose too 
much structure onto the users (Schoop et al., 2003) and overstrain their 
information-processing abilities.  
 
 
Figure 15: Pleasure/Displeasure Evolution According to VienNA Use/DSS 
  
The results imply that using VienNA in the final phase in case when the 
negotiators do not have decision support, causes them to differ greatly in terms 
of offers and counteroffers, as can be observed by the levels of contract 
imbalance presented in Table 31. This result relates to the first finding 
discussed in this chapter, and implies that even when VienNA is used in 
negotiations without DSS, its use in the final phase is not likely to improve the 
contract balance between the negotiators. 
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D) Conclusion 
 
With the findings brought to light in this thesis, we contribute to negotiation 
research by emphasizing the importance of emotions in an online negotiation 
setting and by confirming the social-emotional orientation of CMC. We 
furthermore provide evidence for several effects of NSS on emotional dynamics 
from a process perspective and, supported by our findings, make suggestions 
for when and in which circumstances to use a Negotiator Assistant. In addition, 
we provide insight on the effects of DSS on the emotional behavior of online 
negotiation participants. 
Our results show that pleasure/displeasure tends to change over time, as 
negotiators pass through different phases of the online negotiation. The 
patterns of this emotional dynamics differ upon whether an agreement was 
reached or not. In this respect, successful negotiations are characterized by an 
increase of pleasure in the final phase, whereas in failed negotiations 
negotiators tend to express more displeasure in the final phase because of the 
inability to resolve issues. However, we found no difference in emotional 
patterns when we compared negotiations with and without DSS. T-tests also 
confirmed the inexistence of effects of DSS on the emotional strength of 
exchanged messages. These implications notwithstanding, our results indicate 
that negotiations with and without DSS differ on the emotional similarity of 
negotiator behavior. There is indication of more similarity in the alert/calm 
emotional behavior of negotiators in successful as compared to failed 
negotiations. We therefore contribute to research by providing empirical 
evidence of reciprocity/emotional contagion in online negotiations and its effect 
on the outcome.  
We argue that all negotiations evolve similarly in the beginning, regardless of 
the presence of DSS and their outcome. This is supported by our results, which 
show that the emotional effects of a support system become visible only in the 
last phase.  Another implication of this study concerns the timing of the use of a 
Negotiator Assistant (in this case - VienNA). Our results support the notion of 
“over-structuring” of negotiation participants, by showing that too much structure 
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(i.e. DSS and NSS simultaneously) causes negative effects on the emotional 
behavior of participants. This is why we suggest that VienNA be used in the first 
negotiation phase only in case of negotiations without decision support. 
Future research should investigate the effects of a NSS on emotional behavior 
of negotiators in more detail, if possible with a larger sample size of negotiating 
dyads. Furthermore, since the participants in negotiation experiments used for 
the purpose of this study did not have a close, emotional bond with the goals of 
the negotiation, we argue that results from a non-simulated online negotiation 
setting might bring forth stronger emotional effects and mediating factors.  
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1) Zusammenfassung (Abstract) 
 
Eine Vielzahl von Studien hat die allgegenwärtige Rolle von Emotionen, bei der 
Gestaltung der menschlichen Kognition, Verhalten (Forgas, 1998; Kelly & 
Barsade, 2001; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Parkinson, 1996; Thompson, 1990), 
und ebenso Prozesse wie Entscheidungsfindung und Verhandlung (Allred et al., 
1997; Kopelman et al., 2006; Kumar, 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000) anerkannt. 
Einige weitgehend abgestützte Erkenntnisse beinhalten den Einfluss von 
Emotionen auf die Überzeugungen und Präferenzen des Verhandlungsführers 
(Barry & Fulmer, 2004; Obeidi et al., 2005), die Informationenverarbeitung 
(Allred et al., 1997; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Daniel Shapiro, 2002), seine 
Urteile (Forgas, 1998; Lupton et al., 2002), innovatives Denken und Kreativität 
bei Problemlösungen (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 
1998). Zudem sind Emotionen eine konstante Quelle wertvoller Informationen 
über die Überzeugungen, Vorlieben und Absichten des Absenders (Barry, 2007; 
Druckman & Olekalns, 2007; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Scherer, 1986). Die zunehmende Bedeutung und 
Allgegenwärtigkeit der Informationstechnologie verursachte einen noch 
größeren Verlass der Menschen auf computervermittelte Kommunikation. Dies 
ist der Grund weshalb elektronische Verhandlungen ein zunehmend 
regelmäßiges Thema in wissenschaftlicher Forschungsliteratur geworden sind. 
Bezüglich dieser Entwicklung, sind wir in der Art und Weise interessiert, wie 
Emotionen in einer Online-Umgebung vermittelt und ausgedrückt werden. Die 
zugrunde liegende Motivation dieser Studie bezieht sich konkret auf die 
ungenügend erforschten Wirkungen des Decision Support Systems (DSS) und 
des Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) auf die emotionalen Muster, die sich 
während einer online Verhandlung entwickeln. Wir benutzen die Technik der 
multidimensionalen Skalierung um zwei emotionale Dimensionen 
(pleasure/displeasure und alert/calm) in Textnachrichten zu unterscheiden und 
zu kennzeichnen, die während eines online Verhandlungsexperimentes 
ausgetauscht wurden. Dies hat uns ermöglicht, bestimmte Emotionen mit den 
Mustern, die in der Verhandlung aufgetreten sind, und mit den Ergebnissen die 
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ihnen folgten zu verbinden. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie war es, bestimmte 
emotionale Dynamik, die für erfolgreiche und gescheiterte Verhandlungen mit 
und ohne DSS charakteristisch sind aufzudecken, und aufgrund unserer 
Erkenntnisse, Vorschläge bezüglich der zeitlichen Planung der Nutzung eines 
Verhandlungsassistenten (Negotiator Assistant) zu machen. 
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